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DOES AN INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL QUALIFY
FOR IMMUNITY UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT?: A HUMAN RIGHTSBASED APPROACH TO RESOLVING
A PROBLEMATIC CIRCUIT SPLIT
HEATHER L. WILLIAMS*
“[T]he Courts cannot isolate themselves from the great moral issues
of the day. In the application of law, courts, as other organs of government, must also think of the consequences of their decisions and
of their effect on human rights.” 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the years since foreign sovereign immunity was developed in
the United States, originally as a common-law doctrine and later
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),2 a split among
the circuit courts of appeals has emerged as to whether an individual
government official is eligible for sovereign immunity.3 A majority of
the circuits hold that individual government officials are entitled to
Copyright  2010 by Heather L. Williams.
* Heather L. Williams is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School
of Law where she is a staff editor for the Maryland Law Review. The author is grateful to
Professor Peter Danchin for engaging her in conversations that were critical to the development and improvement of this piece. The author would also like to thank Professor
Robert Condlin, whose mentorship, support, and humor have made Maryland feel like
home.
1. Judge Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 581, 591–92 (1993).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1603–1611 (2006). Foreign sovereign immunity is undoubtedly
an issue of international law. See, e.g., id. § 1602 (noting that the approach taken in the
FSIA mirrors the prevailing doctrine in international law). The focus of this Comment,
however, is on the approach of United States courts with respect to the specific issues of
sovereign immunity currently arising under the FSIA. American courts seem to have taken
the approach that because the FSIA operates as a “controlling” legislative act, “resort” to
international law is not necessary. Cf. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(“[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .” (emphasis
added)). Because this piece charts and comments on the circuit split arising under the
FSIA in domestic courts, fascinating issues of international law are, unfortunately, left
aside.
3. See infra Part II.C.
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immunity under the statutory framework of the FSIA.4 A minority of
circuits hold, however, that individual government officials are not entitled to FSIA immunity.5 Although the circuit courts have, by and
large, framed the debate as one of statutory construction, the different conclusions arrived at by each side may be explained by the different factual circumstances in which the issue was confronted. The
minority addressed the issue in the context of human rights litigation
brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”).6
The majority’s interpretation of the statute, however, occurred
outside of the TVPA.7 Resolution of this circuit split could be meaningfully achieved by accepting the majority doctrine—that individual
government officials are entitled to foreign sovereign immunity—
while recognizing an exception for human rights cases brought under
the TVPA.8 Such an exception would create consistency between the
FSIA and the TVPA,9 ensure that contemporary interpretation of the
FSIA adheres to the goals Congress had in mind when the statute was
enacted in 1976,10 and acknowledge that human rights litigation
brought under the TVPA involves a set of fundamental values and interests that may not be present in other kinds of litigation.11
II.

BACKGROUND

Foreign sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law
“under which domestic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state.”12 Foreign sovereign immunity developed
over a period of 140 years in the United States, during which time the
approach of American courts shifted from a theory of absolute sovereign immunity to one of restrictive immunity.13 In its common-law
incarnation, courts strongly deferred to the suggestions of the political branches when making determinations of sovereign immunity.14
4. See infra Part II.C.1.
5. See infra Part II.C.2.
6. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
7. See infra Part II.C.1.
8. Future resolution of the circuit split seems likely given that the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether an individual government official
acting in his official capacity is entitled to immunity under the FSIA. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (No. 08-1555).
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.A.2–3.
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In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA to codify the existing common
law of restrictive immunity and transfer the power for making immunity determinations from the political branches to the judiciary.15
The FSIA creates a statutory presumption of immunity from suit in
American courts for those entities that constitute a “foreign state,”
subject to a set of exceptions.16 In recent years, a split has developed
among the circuit courts of appeals as to whether an individual government official constitutes a “foreign state” for purposes of FSIA immunity.17 Circuits that have confronted the issue in the context of
human rights litigation brought under the TVPA18 have held that individual government officials are not eligible for FSIA immunity.19
Circuits that have confronted the issue outside of the TVPA context,
however, have held that individual governmental officials are eligible
for immunity under the FSIA.20
A. As the Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Developed in the
United States, It Shifted from an Absolute to Restrictive Theory
of Immunity
Between 1812 and 1976, the theory of foreign sovereign immunity developed in the United States, transforming from a theory of
absolute immunity, under which all acts of a sovereign state were entitled to immunity,21 to a theory of restrictive immunity, under which
only the public acts of sovereign states were entitled to immunity.22 It
also evolved from common-law doctrine to statute with the 1976 enactment of the FSIA, which provides a presumption of sovereign immunity to foreign sovereigns, subject to various exceptions.23
1. Chief Justice John Marshall’s Opinion in The Schooner
Exchange First Addressed the Theory of Foreign Sovereign
Immunity in American Courts and Adopted an
Absolute Approach to Questions of Immunity
Chief Justice John Marshall issued the first statement of foreign
sovereign immunity in American judicial thought in the 1812 case The
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
infra
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Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part

II.B.1.
II.B.2.
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II.D.
II.C.2.
II.C.1.
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Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.24 In The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether an American citizen could assert title in American court to an armed vessel
“commissioned by, and in the service of the emperor of France,” and
found in American waters.25 The Court held that the ship was the
practical equivalent of the foreign sovereign and was therefore immune from suit in American courts.26 The Court based its conclusion,
first, on the acknowledgement that all foreign sovereigns possess complete and exclusive territorial jurisdiction over their land.27 The
Court then presented several analogous cases in which a common interest in “mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with
each other” had led to an understanding among foreign sovereigns
that the sovereign had temporarily waived the exercise of its complete
jurisdiction.28 Based on that understanding, Chief Justice Marshall offered the following reasons for concluding that a ship of war, such as
the Schooner Exchange, is entitled to immunity when entering a friendly
port: (1) no injury to the country is likely to ensue from the ship’s
entry into port without an express waiver or special license;29 (2) ships
of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly nation;30
and (3) the French ship’s entry into the friendly American port constituted an “implied promise”31 that while in the port, the ship would be
exempt from the jurisdiction of the country that it had entered.32
24. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
25. Id. at 135, 146. McFaddon, the American citizen, claimed prior ownership of the
French vessel. Id. at 117.
26. Id. at 145–46; see also id. at 144 (noting that the armed public vessel “constitutes a
part of the military force of her nation, acts under the immediate and direct command of
the sovereign, [and] is employed by him in national objects”).
27. Id. at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.”).
28. Id. at 137. The three analogous cases are as follows: (1) the exemption from arrest
or detention in a foreign country of the “person of the sovereign,” based on a universal
understanding that a sovereign does not intend to subject himself to jurisdiction that is
“incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his nation” simply by entering another
nation; (2) the grant of immunity to foreign ministers, based on the principle that without
such immunity, “every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad”; and (3) the grant of immunity to foreign troops when the sovereign has
allowed them to pass through its jurisdiction. Id. at 137–40.
29. Id. at 141. The same injury likely to accrue from “march[ing] . . . an army through
an inhabited country” does not ensue from permitting a ship of war to enter a foreign
state’s friendly port without an express waiver by that state. Id.
30. Id. (noting that if no notice of a prohibition on entry is provided by the country of
entry, “the ports of a friendly nation are considered as open to the public ships of all
powers with whom it is at peace”).
31. Id. at 147.
32. Id. at 143 (commenting that is “impossible . . . to conceive” that a foreign sovereign, having secured for its troops safe passage or asylum in times of distress in the ports of
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Based on Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration that all foreign sovereigns are entitled to complete and exclusive territorial jurisdiction
over their land,33 The Schooner Exchange came to be seen as an endorsement of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns.34 Absolute immunity provides foreign sovereigns with total exemption from suit in
United States courts.35 The Schooner Exchange also makes clear that foreign sovereign immunity is “a matter of grace and comity on the part
of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”36 As such, until 1976, the judiciary routinely deferred to the
decisions of the political branches in making sovereign immunity
determinations.
2. Until 1976, the Executive Branch Played a Primary Role in
Judicial Determinations of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
For the 140 years following The Schooner Exchange, the judiciary
regularly deferred to the recommendations of the Executive Branch
in making foreign sovereign immunity determinations.37 During that
a friendly nation, “should mean to subject his army or his navy to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign”); see also id. at 144 (arguing that the implied license under which a ship
enters a friendly port should be reasonably construed as “containing an exemption from
the jurisdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality”).
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); see also Berizzi Bros.
v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571 (1926) (“In the [Schooner Exchange] opinion the Chief
Justice attributed to every nation an exclusive and absolute jurisdiction within its own territory subject to no limitation not having its consent, [and] observed that the consent might
be either express or implied . . . .”).
35. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990) (commenting
that under the absolute view of foreign sovereign immunity expressed by Chief Justice
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange, “a foreign state enjoy[s] immunity from all suits” in
American courts); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (8th ed. 2004) (defining absolute
immunity as a “complete exemption from civil liability, usu. afforded to officials while performing particularly important functions, such as a representative enacting legislation and
a judge presiding over a lawsuit”).
36. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)
(noting that comity is “neither a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and
good will,” but rather “is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its . . . citizens” and all other individuals
who might fall “under the protection of its laws”). Simply put, comity is a practice that
involves “mutual recognition of legislative, executive and judicial acts” among separate political entities. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004).
37. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; see, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
34–35 (1945) (noting that “[i]n the absence of recognition of the claimed immunity by the
political branch of the government, the courts may decide . . . whether all the requisites of
immunity exist”); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943) (noting that because questions of sovereign immunity involve the “dignity and rights of a friendly sovereign state,” it is particularly important that “the action of the political arm of the
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time, the State Department customarily requested that immunity be
granted in all proceedings brought against friendly sovereigns.38 The
Department made such requests by supplying the court with a “suggestion of immunity.”39 Based on that suggestion, the court would dismiss the suit.40 In 1952, Jack B. Tate, the State Department’s Acting
Legal Adviser, recommended that the policy of granting immunity to
all friendly sovereigns be modified.41 The Tate Letter, as it came to be
called, recommended adopting a more limited theory of foreign sovereign immunity.42
3. The Tate Letter Signaled the Adoption of a Restrictive Approach to
Sovereign Immunity
In the 1952 Tate Letter, the State Department indicated that it
would advise United States courts not to grant sovereign immunity to
the non-governmental acts of a foreign state.43 This announcement
signaled the Executive Branch’s adoption of a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which immunity is limited to suits involving
the public acts of a foreign sovereign and does not pertain to suits
involving the strictly commercial acts of a foreign state.44 Upon issuance of the Tate Letter, American courts “formally adopted the restrictive view of sovereign immunity,”45 despite the fact that the theory
was “not initially enacted into law.”46 A Restatement on foreign relations law in the United States summarized the principles that courts
used in making determinations of immunity under the new restrictive
theory: Courts were to grant immunity to (1) the foreign state itself,
(2) the head of the foreign state, (3) the state’s government or any
Government taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized,” and that the
court defer to that action).
38. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.
39. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 880.
41. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487 & n.9.
42. Id. at 487.
43. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Jack B.
Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26
DEP’T ST. BULL. 984–85 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976)); see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 n.1 (1989) (summarizing the historical background).
44. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
45. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1099.
46. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Congress later codified the restrictive theory of immunity in the FSIA. See infra Part II.B (noting that codification of the common law was a
primary motivation behind congressional enactment of the FSIA and generally detailing
the process by which the FSIA became law).
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governmental agency, (4) the head of government, (5) a foreign minister, or (6) “‘any other public minister, official, or agent of the state
with respect to acts performed in his official capacity.’”47 The restrictive theory, however, proved difficult to apply, and the Executive
Branch retained primary responsibility for making immunity
determinations.48
Generally, when a foreign state faced litigation in American
courts, it would request a finding or suggestion of immunity from the
State Department,49 often applying diplomatic pressure on the Department in the process.50 The State Department usually based its
suggestions to the relevant court on interpretation of the common-law
principles collected in the Restatement.51 Courts treated these suggestions, however, as “binding determinations” upon which they
would either grant or deny sovereign immunity.52 Also complicating
foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence was the fact that foreign
governments did not always request a suggestion of immunity from
the State Department, which required the courts to determine
whether immunity was due, a process that generally involved referring
to prior State Department decisions.53 Because immunity determinations were made by both the courts and the Executive Branch, subject
to a multitude of legal and diplomatic factors, “the governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.”54 By the 1970s, Con47. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1099–100 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELALAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66 (1965)).
48. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
49. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
50. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487. Occasionally, “political considerations led to suggestions
of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive
theory.” Id. (citing Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R.
11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 34–35 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State)).
51. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
52. Id.; see, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (“The certification
and the request that the [sovereign] be declared immune must be accepted by the courts
as a conclusive determination by the political arm of the Government that [further judicial
action] interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69 reporter’s note (1965)
(outlining the approach to be taken by courts in cases in which the State Department had
spoken to the question of whether or not immunity should be granted).
53. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
54. Id. at 488 (citing Frederic Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:
Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 11 (1976) (noting that
under the pre-1976 common law, “the foreign state defendant could determine which
branch of the government—the State Department or the court”—would evaluate its
claim)).
TIONS
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gress had grown concerned that the application of sovereign
immunity law under the Tate Letter subjected “immunity decisions . . .
to diplomatic pressures rather than the rule of law.”55 Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976 to remedy these concerns.
B. The FSIA Was Designed to Provide a Statutory Basis for
Maintaining a Suit Against a Foreign State and for Granting
Immunity to a Foreign State Where Appropriate
Congress enacted the FSIA amidst concerns about application of
the foreign sovereign immunities doctrine.56 The FSIA was designed
to provide a statutory basis for determining when and how parties are
able to maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state in American courts
and when a foreign state is entitled to immunity.57
The Supreme Court has definitively ruled that the FSIA provides
the “sole basis” for securing subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign
state in federal courts.58 The Court reasoned that because the district
courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign state is
entitled to immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1604,59 and because 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) confers jurisdiction on the district courts for all suits
brought by citizens and noncitizens so long as the subject of the suit is
not entitled to immunity,60 the district courts must invoke the FSIA in
all actions against a foreign sovereign as the sole basis of subject matter jurisdiction.61 The House Judiciary Committee Report on the
FSIA, which states that the statute “sets forth the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United
States,” also supports the Supreme Court’s conclusion.62 The House
Report indicates that Congress intended, in enacting the FSIA, to codify the existing common-law theory of restrictive immunity and to shift
55. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
56. Id.
57. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 1 (1976).
58. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006) (providing foreign states with immunity from suit in federal courts with limited exceptions).
60. Id. § 1330(a) (providing that the district courts have original jurisdiction over “any
nonjury civil action against a foreign state . . . with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under [the FSIA] or under any applicable international agreement”).
The Supreme Court interpreted § 1330(a) in Amerada Hess based on the “settled proposition that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is determined by Congress in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public
good.” 488 U.S. at 433 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 434–35.
62. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12.
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responsibility for immunity determinations from the executive to the
judiciary.63 In an effort to meet these goals, the FSIA provided a statutory presumption of immunity for “foreign states,” subject to a set of
limited exceptions.64
1. In Providing a Statutory Basis for Sovereign Immunity, Congress
Sought to Codify the Existing Common-Law Doctrine of Restrictive
Immunity and to Shift Responsibility for Deciding Questions of
Sovereign Immunity to the Judiciary
According to the House Report, Congress intended that the FSIA
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as it existed in contemporary international law.65 Congress endorsed the adoption of
this principle because the Judicial and Executive Branches had relied
on restrictive immunity since 1952, when the State Department first
announced it as official policy.66 Furthermore, the theory of restrictive immunity was “regularly applied against the United States” when
it was the subject of a suit in foreign courts.67 Therefore, consistent
application of the restrictive theory of immunity by statutory codification would match the approach of nearly every other country—where
decisions as to foreign sovereign immunity were exclusively judicial,
rather than political.68
While codification of the existing common-law doctrine was one
of Congress’s chief aims, “[t]he principal change envisioned by the
[FSIA] was to remove the role of the State Department in determining
immunity.”69 Congress wished to ensure that the restrictive theory of
immunity would actually be applied in litigation before federal
courts.70 Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, this was not always what
happened. Foreign states seeking immunity frequently urged the
State Department to make a “formal suggestion of immunity to the
court,” often using diplomatic tools to influence the Department’s
suggestion.71 Congress determined that authority for immunity decisionmaking should be shifted to the judiciary because the existing policy of deferring to the State Department (1) placed the State
Department in the “awkward position of a political institution . . . ap63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
Id. See generally supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the effect of the Tate Letter).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
Id.
Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
Id.
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ply[ing] a legal standard” to pending litigation without the necessary
“machinery” of evidence-taking or appellate review,72 (2) required the
foreign state to elect which immunity decisions it would leave to the
courts and which decisions it would appeal to the State Department,73
and (3) raised concerns for private litigants about whether their legal
disputes with foreign states would be handled on “the basis of nonlegal considerations,” and under the weight of diplomatic pressures.74
The FSIA addressed these concerns by (1) eliminating the Department’s ability to make legal evaluations as to sovereign immunity, (2)
requiring foreign states to present their immunity defenses to the
courts, thereby preventing them from influencing the immunity determination by applying persuasive or diplomatic pressures on the
State Department, and (3) ensuring that neutral and non-politically
motivated arbiters decide immunity issues.75
Under the statute, courts should no longer use suggestions of immunity from the State Department as “binding determinations of immunity.”76 Because the FSIA is the sole mode of obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state, any court’s decision on immunity must be based
upon the provisions of the statute.77 Therefore, if an entity qualifies
as a “foreign state” within the statutory definition, and no exception to
immunity applies, that entity should be granted immunity under the
FSIA.78

72. Id. at 8. Furthermore, the FSIA alleviated pressure applied by foreign governments
regarding the status of a request for sovereign immunity and eliminated potential “adverse
consequences” that might come about from the Department’s unwillingness to support
their position on immunity. Id. at 7.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 9.
75. See id. at 7 (discussing how the statute transfers immunity decisionmaking authority
to the courts).
76. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990). Interestingly,
some courts have continued, despite the enactment of the FSIA, to defer to the judgments
of the Executive Branch—often staying cases pending receipt of a governmental statement
of interest. See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 & n.10
(E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007) (noting that after waiting two years for the State Department to
reply to the court’s request for a statement of interest, the court reinstated the case to the
active docket), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009); cf.
Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the role of State
Department statements of interest in determining whether a claim against a foreign state is
a non-justiciable political question), aff’d, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009).
77. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1100.
78. See infra Part II.B.2.
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2. Unless an Exception Applies, the FSIA Generally Provides that a
“Foreign State” Is Immune from the Jurisdiction of United
States Courts
According to Section 1604, subject to international agreements
existing at the time of the statute’s enactment, “a foreign state shall be
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States,” with
limited exceptions.79 According to the House Judiciary Committee
Report, “the burden [is] on the foreign state to produce evidence in
support of its claim of immunity.”80 This Section should be read,
therefore, as granting a presumption of immunity to foreign sovereigns and their entities, so long as the sovereign can prove that it constitutes a “foreign state” under the statutory definition81 and that it is
not exempted from immunity by one of the seven statutory
exceptions.82
a. A “Foreign State” Includes a “Political Subdivision of a Foreign
State” or an “Agency or Instrumentality” of the State
Under Section 1603(a), a “foreign state” includes a state itself, “a
political subdivision of a foreign state,” or an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.”83 Subsection (b) defines an “agency or instrumentality” of the state as any entity that is “a separate legal person,
corporate or otherwise,” “an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,” or an entity, a “majority of whose shares or other ownership interest” is owned by the former,84 and is neither a United
States citizen nor created by the laws of a third country.85 The House
Judiciary Committee Report and judicial interpretations of the FSIA
provide additional meaning to these terms. First, the “separate legal
person” criterion is designed to include associations, corporations,
foundations, or other entities that can sue or be sued, enter into con79. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
80. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17.
81. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
82. See infra Part II.B.2.b; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17 (noting that the statute
starts with a presumption of immunity and then creates a set of exceptions to that general
rule).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
84. Id. § 1603(b). Because the phrase “other ownership interest” follows the word
“shares,” it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as “refer[ring] to a type of interest
other than ownership of stock.” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003). A
political subdivision, as used in the statute, “includes all governmental units beneath the
central government, including local governments.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b); see also id. § 1332(c)(1) (providing the statutory definition for
when a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of a state); id. § 1332(d)(10) (defining citizenship for an unincorporated association).
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tracts, or hold property in their own names, based on the foreign state
law under which they were created.86 Second, the “organ of a foreign
state” criterion is intended to indicate that if an entity is entirely
owned by a state, it necessarily falls within the “agency or instrumentality” definition.87 If, however, ownership is divided between state
and private interests, the entity constitutes an “agency or instrumentality” only if a majority of its ownership interests are owned either by
the state itself or by a political subdivision thereof.88 Finally, the criterion that excludes entities that are citizens of the United States or
created by the laws of a third country is intended to address the rationale that if a foreign state either attains or creates a legal entity in a
foreign country, that entity is “presumptively engaging in activities
that are either commercial or private in nature.”89
According to the House Judiciary Committee Report, entities that
meet the “agency or instrumentality” definition could come in a variety of forms, including a state trading company, a mining venture, a
transport business, including shipping lines and airlines,90 a steel industry, a central bank,91 an export organization, and a “governmental
procurement agency or a department or ministry which acts and is
suable in its own name.”92 Whether an individual government official,
acting in his official capacity, constitutes an “agency or instrumentality” of the state is the subject of a current circuit split.93 Two other
86. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15.
87. Id.; see, e.g., Globe Nuclear Servs. & Supply GNSS, Ltd. v. AO Techsnabexport, 376
F.3d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a company entirely owned by the Russian Federation constitutes an “agency or instrumentality”); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors
Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that an entity “wholly owned by the
Dominican government” is “undisputedly” a “foreign state” under the FSIA); Ofikuru v.
Nig. Airlines Ltd., 670 F. Supp. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that an airline is an “instrumentality” of the state because “all of the shares of [its] capital stock are owned” by the
Nigerian government).
88. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15; see, e.g., Carey v. Nat’l Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that a corporation is “clearly a ‘foreign state’ for jurisdictional purposes” if a majority of its ownership interest is owned by the foreign government), aff’d, 592 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1979).
89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15. An example of such an entity would be a “corporation organized and incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, but owned by a
foreign state.” Id. (citing Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524, 526–27
(C.C.P.A. 1934)).
90. See, e.g., Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173,
180 (2d Cir. 2003) (national railroad company); NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda
Indon., 7 F.3d 35, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1993) (national airline).
91. See, e.g., Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 1990) (national
bank).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15–16.
93. See infra Part II.C (detailing the positions of the various courts in the FSIA circuit
split).
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questions as to the immunity of individual government officials, however, are more settled. First, an individual official acting outside the
scope of his official capacity is not eligible for FSIA immunity.94 Similarly, officials acting beyond the scope of their government-given authority, when that authority is limited by law, are not entitled to
immunity under the FSIA.95
While questions remain as to what constitutes an “agency or instrumentality” under Section 1603, one thing is clear: If an entity does
not meet the definition of a “foreign state,” it should not be granted
sovereign immunity in any suit in the United States.96 Immunity is not
established, however, solely by showing that an entity meets the definition of a “foreign state.”97 A court must also consider whether sovereign immunity could be denied on the grounds that one of the
immunity exceptions found in Sections 1605 and 1605A applies.
b. Sections 1605(a) and 1605A Provide Seven Exceptions to
Section 1604’s General Immunity Rule Under Which a
Foreign State Is to Be Denied Sovereign Immunity
Sections 1605(a) and 1605A provide that a foreign state is not
immune from suit if it falls within one of seven exceptions.98 A foreign state will not have “presumptive immunity”99 in cases involving
the following: (1) waiver of immunity;100 (2) commercial activities oc94. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that in cases in
which the FSIA has been applied to individuals, “the individual must have been acting in
his official capacity”); I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., 351 F.3d 1184, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that FSIA immunity does not apply to the Pakistani Minister
of Agriculture for a suit brought against him in his individual capacity); Park v. Shin, 313
F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a Korean official sued by a personal family
employee for employment-related claims was not eligible for immunity because he was not
acting within the scope of his official duties when he hired and supervised the employee);
Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1106 (noting that the defendant would not be entitled to immunity
for acts committed outside of his official capacity).
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) (1965) (discussing the immunity of foreign officials acting in their official capacities); cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949) (noting,
in the context of a suit to enjoin the acts of a domestic administrator, that “where the
officer’s powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered
individual and not sovereign actions” and that “[t]he officer is not doing the business
which the sovereign has empowered him to do”).
96. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 15.
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West Supp. 2009).
99. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 377 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49
(2009).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Immunity may be waived either explicitly or by implication. Id.
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curring in the United States or causing a direct effect therein;101 (3)
property expropriated in violation of international law;102 (4) property located in the United States that was inherited, gifted, or is immovable;103 (5) non-commercial torts occurring in the United
States;104 (6) arbitration agreements;105 and (7) state-sponsored terrorism.106 If one of these seven exceptions is applicable, the presump-

101. Id. § 1605(a)(2). The commercial activity must be the subject of the action. Id.
102. Id. § 1605(a)(3). That property, or any property exchanged for it, must either be
(1) itself located in the United States in connection with the commercial activities of a
foreign state in the United States, or (2) “owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of [a] foreign state . . . that [is] engaged in . . . commercial activity in the United States.”
Id.
103. Id. § 1605(a)(4). The word “property” refers to rights in property. Id.
104. Id. § 1605(a)(5). The non-commercial torts exception covers any suit in which (1)
a plaintiff seeks monetary damages, (2) for personal injury or death, or property damage
or loss, (3) that occurred in the United States, and (4) that was caused by a tortious act or
omission by a foreign state or its official or employee acting in his official capacity. Id. The
rule does not apply to (1) claims based on “failure to . . . perform a discretionary function,”
or (2) claims “arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.” Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A)–(B).
105. Id. § 1605(a)(6). This exception is limited to cases in which the action was brought
either to (1) “enforce an agreement made by the foreign state . . . to submit to arbitration”
any issues arising under a “defined legal relationship” with itself and a private litigant, or
(2) “to confirm an award [that was] made pursuant to . . . an agreement to arbitrate.” Id.
106. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West Supp. 2009). This exception grants jurisdiction to federal courts over cases brought by United States citizens against foreign governments seeking damages for alleged acts of extrajudicial killing, torture, aircraft sabotage, hostagetaking, and providing material support or resources for such acts. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 104383, at 62 (1995). To proceed under the terrorism exception, a host of factors must be
met: (1) the victim must have been a U.S. national, a member of the armed forces, or a
U.S. government employee or contractor at the time of the alleged terrorist action; (2) the
lawsuit must allege that the terrorist conduct was performed or material support or resources were offered by an “official, employee, or agent” of a foreign state, acting in his
official capacity; and (3) the foreign state against whom the conduct is alleged must have
either been designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act occurred or was
designated a state sponsor as a result of the act in question, and remains so designated at
the time the claim is filed or was so designated in the six months prior to the filing of the
claim. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A. A country’s government is designated a “state sponsor of terrorism” by the Secretary of State. Id. § 1605A(h)(6). That determination is based on a
finding that the government in question “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Id. Currently, four countries are designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism,
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). The terrorism exception to the FSIA applies, therefore, only to cases brought by U.S. citizens who have been
injured by the terrorist activity of or material support of terrorism by one of these four
states or their employees operating in their official capacity. Prior to enactment of the
terrorism exception, some legislators argued that a broader and more general exception to
the FSIA for all cases of human rights violations would be appropriate. See infra note 221
(outlining a variety of proposals to amend the FSIA to include a human rights exception).

R
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tion of foreign sovereign immunity is lost, and the “foreign state” may
be eligible for suit in the courts of the United States.107
C. After the FSIA Was Enacted, a Split Developed Among the Circuits
as to Whether an Individual Government Official Constitutes
an “Agency or Instrumentality” of the State Under Section
1603(b) and Is Therefore Eligible for Foreign
Sovereign Immunity
Over the last twenty years, the federal circuits have split as to
whether individual government officials are eligible for FSIA immunity on the grounds that they meet the statutory definition of a “foreign state” as provided in Section 1603.108 Five circuits—the Ninth
Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit, and the Second Circuit—have held that individual government officials are immune from suit under the FSIA because they constitute an “agency or instrumentality” of the state when acting in their
official capacity.109 Two circuits—the Fourth Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit—have held that individual officials are not eligible for FSIA
immunity because they do not constitute an “agency or instrumentality” of the state.110 The courts involved in the circuit split confronted
the issue in different contexts. While the courts in the minority of the
circuit split addressed the issue in the context of serious human rights
litigation brought under the TVPA, the majority tackled the issue
outside of the TVPA context, and in some cases, in the context of
banking, commercial, and industrial transactions.111
1. According to the Majority of Circuits, Which Addressed the
Question Outside of the Context of Human Rights Litigation
Brought Under the TVPA, an Individual Government Official
Constitutes an “Agency or Instrumentality” of the State Under
Section 1603(b) and Is Therefore Eligible for Immunity
In 1990, the question of whether an individual government official is eligible for immunity under the FSIA was first addressed at the
circuit court level by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in what has come to be regarded as the “seminal . . . deci107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (providing a presumption of immunity); id. § 1605(a) (outlining exceptions to immunity).
108. See id. § 1603 (defining “foreign state”); see also supra Part II.B.2.a.
109. See infra Part II.C.1.
110. See infra Part II.C.2.
111. See infra Part II.C.1–2.
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sion”112 for the majority viewpoint—Chuidian v. Philippine National
Bank.113 In Chuidian, a Philippine citizen (plaintiff Chuidian)
brought suit against a Philippine government official (defendant
Daza) for instructing the Philippine National Bank to dishonor a letter of credit that the Philippine government had issued to
Chuidian.114 The state-owned Philippine National Bank had issued an
irrevocable letter of credit in 1985 to Chuidian, the owner of various
business interests, to settle a previous lawsuit.115 In 1986, however,
President Corazon Aquino took control of the Philippine government
and formed the Presidential Commission on Good Government to recover “ill-gotten wealth” accumulated under the former Marcos presidency.116 Daza, as a member of that commission and acting pursuant
to authority granted to him by the President, instructed the bank to
prevent payment under the letter of credit issued to Chuidian based
on concerns that Chuidian’s letter of credit was the result of a fraudulent settlement with Marcos.117 When the bank refused to make payment, Chuidian brought suit against Daza and the bank.118 Daza
moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that, inter alia, he was entitled to sovereign immunity.119 The Ninth Circuit, on appeal, held
112. Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49
(2009).
113. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
114. Id. at 1097.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1098. Chuidian argued that because the “agency or instrumentality” language of the FSIA does not apply to individual government officials, and because the FSIA
provides the sole source of sovereign immunity, Daza could not be granted immunity. Id.
at 1101. The U.S. government argued in a “Statement of Interest” submitted to the court,
however, that while Daza was not eligible for immunity under the FSIA, he may have been
eligible for immunity under the pre-FSIA common-law doctrine of immunity. Id. According to the government’s argument, the FSIA applies only to “foreign states” as defined in
Section 1603(b). Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Entities not covered by the FSIA
may still be immune from suit under common-law principles of immunity. Id. This continues to be the position of the United States government today. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270) (“[F]oreign officials . . . do enjoy immunity from suit for their
official acts. This immunity is not codified in the FSIA but instead is rooted in longstanding common law that the FSIA did not displace.”); cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 6, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009) (No. 08-1555)
(arguing that the “principles articulated by the Executive Branch, [and] not the FSIA properly govern” questions of sovereign immunity for individual government officials). The
Ninth Circuit in Chuidian dismissed the government’s argument that the pre-FSIA common law should apply on the grounds that “[a]bsent an explicit direction from the statute . . . such a bifurcated approach to sovereign immunity was not intended by the Act” for
the following reasons: (1) Congress intended the FSIA to be comprehensive, and the
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that Daza was eligible for FSIA immunity for acts undertaken in his
official capacity as an “agency or instrumentality of the state.”120
The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion for three reasons.
First, the court noted that because neither Section 1603(b) nor the
accompanying legislative history explicitly includes or excludes individuals, the most that can be said is that the statute is ambiguous on
the issue, and therefore, limiting the statute’s application would be
inappropriate.121 Second, because suing an individual for actions undertaken in his official capacity is the “practical equivalent” of suing
the sovereign directly, permitting suit against individual government
officials would “amount to a blanket abrogation of foreign sovereign
immunity” and would permit individuals to do indirectly what the
FSIA forbids them from doing directly—bring suit against a foreign
sovereign.122 Finally, permitting suit against individual government
officials would amount to a “substantial unannounced departure from
prior common[-]law” principles and would therefore run counter to
Congress’s announced desire to codify existing common-law principles in the statute.123 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning proved to be influential throughout other circuits.
In 1996, the D.C. Circuit confronted the same issue in El-Fadl v.
Central Bank of Jordan.124 In El-Fadl, a Jordanian resident (plaintiff ElFadl) brought suit against a variety of defendants, including the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan (defendant Marto), for
various employment-related tort claims.125 On appeal, the D.C. Circourts have consistently interpreted it as such; (2) Congress intended, in creating the FSIA,
to remove the role of the State Department; and (3) “[N]o authority supports the continued validity of the pre-1976 common law in light of the Act.” Chuidian, 912 F.2d at
1102–03. At present, therefore, the FSIA, and not pre-existing common-law doctrines, governs this area of the law.
120. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1103.
121. Id. at 1101. According to the court, while the terms “agency,” “instrumentality,”
“organ,” “entity,” and “legal person” more easily “connot[e] an organization or collective,”
they do not “in their typical legal usage necessarily exclude individuals.” Id. (emphasis
added).
122. Id. at 1101–02; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)
(noting that “official-capacity suits” are another method of pleading an action against the
entity for which the individual officer is acting as an agent); Morongo Band of Mission
Indians v. Cal. St. Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1382 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A claim . . .
against a state officer acting in his official capacity is treated as a claim against the state
itself.”).
123. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101–02 (arguing that prior to 1976, the common law
granted immunity to individual officials acting in their official capacity).
124. 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 669–70. From 1982 to 1989, Petra Bank, a privately owned Jordanian bank,
employed El-Fadl under a contract that guaranteed him employment for life. Id. at 670.
The Central Bank of Jordan announced that it had discovered prevalent “financial impro-
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cuit, holding that an individual may qualify as an “agency or instrumentality” of the state, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the
claims against Marto on the grounds that he was eligible for sovereign
immunity under the FSIA.126 The court cited the Chuidian decision as
support for its conclusion that an individual may constitute an “agency
or instrumentality” of the state, but it did not discuss the question
further except to note that although El-Fadl claimed that he was suing
Marto in his individual capacity, the record “show[ed] that Marto’s
activities . . . were neither personal nor private, but were undertaken
only on behalf of the Central Bank.”127 Given the lack of evidentiary
support for El-Fadl’s individual-capacity claim against Marto, the court
dismissed the action against him.128
The Fifth Circuit faced the same immunity issue in the 1999 case
Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal Y Industrial de Olancho S.A.129 Byrd concerned a sawmill run by defendants Pacheco and Figueroa, both citizens of Honduras, and owned by defendant CORFINO, a private
corporation, ninety-eight percent of which was owned and controlled
by the Honduran government.130 In 1995, plaintiff Byrd, an American citizen, became involved as general manager of a project involving
the sawmill.131 Byrd alleged that defendants Pacheco and Figueroa
concocted a scheme to remove Byrd from his position.132 Byrd
brought suit to recover the significant monetary damage that he had
incurred as a result of the illegal plot to remove him from his various
management positions.133 While Byrd conceded that CORFINO was a
“foreign state” and immune from suit under the FSIA because its stock
was almost “entirely in the hands of” the Honduran government, he
argued that Pacheco and Figueroa, CORFINO’s chief officers, were
not eligible for immunity under the FSIA.134 In holding that the officers were eligible for immunity, the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted
prieties” at Petra Bank and placed the bank in receivership. Id. Following this announcement, the Jordanian government appointed a Liquidation Committee, administered by
defendant Marto, to run the bank. Id. In September 1989, Marto sent El-Fadl a letter
terminating his employment at Petra Bank. Id. Four years later, El-Fadl filed suit in the
D.C. District Court alleging that Marto had wrongfully terminated him from his employment. Id. at 671.
126. Id. at 671.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 182 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at 382.
131. Id. at 382–83.
132. Id. at 384.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 388.
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the reasoning of Chuidian, noting as follows: (1) the FSIA
“[n]ormally” extends to protect individuals acting in their official capacity “as officers of corporations considered foreign sovereigns”;135
(2) the protections of the FSIA cease only when the individual acts
beyond his official capacity;136 and (3) personal motives do not always
convert an official action into an individual one, but instead may represent only a “convergence” of personal interests and official duties
and authority.137 Despite the possibility of some personal motivation,
because Pacheco and Figueroa acted in their official capacity during
the alleged conduct, they were held to be immune from suit under
the FSIA.138
The Sixth Circuit next addressed the issue in Keller v. Central Bank
of Nigeria.139 In Keller, an American citizen (plaintiff Keller) who
worked as a sales representative for a Michigan manufacturer that produced mobile hospital and medical centers, was contacted by an individual who identified himself as Prince Arthur Ossai and claimed that
he was Nigerian royalty and a Nigerian government official.140 Ossai
proposed that Keller grant him exclusive rights to the distribution of
his hospital and emergency care facilities in Nigeria.141 Ossai and Keller then reached a deal that included the transfer of a large amount of
funds into an escrow account set up by Keller from which disbursements would be made.142 After paying over $28,000 in fees and
charges that Ossai had requested, Keller realized that he had been the
victim of a con.143 Keller brought suit against Ossai, the Central Bank
of Nigeria and six of its employees, and others.144 On appeal, Keller
did not challenge the district court’s finding that the individual defendants fell within the FSIA’s definition of “agency or instrumentality.”145 The Sixth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s
135. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 130 (stating that CORFINO was almost
entirely owned and controlled by the Honduran government); supra text accompanying
notes 87–88 (noting that an entity that is entirely owned by the state constitutes an “agency
or instrumentality” for purposes of the FSIA, as does an entity where a majority of its ownership interests are owned by the state).
136. Byrd, 182 F.3d at 388.
137. Id. at 389 (“‘Such a circumstance does not serve to make his action any less an
action of his sovereign.’” (quoting Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th
Cir. 1990))).
138. Id.
139. 277 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2002).
140. Id. at 814.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 815–16.

R
R
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finding of immunity for the individual defendants based on acceptance of the precedent established by the Ninth and D.C. Circuits in
Chuidian and El-Fadl and construction of Keller’s silence on the issue
as a concession that the individual defendants were immune from suit
under the FSIA.146
The Second Circuit cast the most recent vote in favor of the majority viewpoint in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001.147 In In
re Terrorist Attacks, plaintiffs, persons injured by the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, “brought tort claims against hundreds of parties,” including “foreign governments, charitable entities, and individuals,” all of whom “alleged[ly] . . . provided financial and logistical
support to al Qaeda” preceding the attacks.148 Most relevant to the
question of the immunity of individual government officials are the
claims against four defendants referred to as the “Four Princes.” The
plaintiffs alleged that the Four Princes, a group of Saudi Arabian
princes that sit on various governing bodies, acting in their official
capacity as members of those bodies, caused monies to be donated to
Muslim charities “with the knowledge that the charities would transfer
the funds to al Qaeda.”149 The Second Circuit, in granting immunity
to the Four Princes, “join[ed its] sister circuits in holding that an individual official of a foreign state acting in his official capacity is the
‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state, and is thereby protected by
the FSIA.”150 In so doing, the court explicitly accepted the reasoning
of Chuidian, observing the following: (1) the term “‘agency’” may
mean “any thing or person through which action is accomplished,”
and is not limited to governmental bureaus or offices;151 (2) such a
reading is “consistent with the evident principle that the state cannot
act except through individuals”;152 and (3) the notion that individuals
146. Id.
147. 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
148. Id. at 75.
149. Id. at 75, 77.
150. Id. at 81. The court also noted that several district judges in its circuit had reached
the same conclusion in several cases. Id.; see, e.g., Leutwyler v. Office of Her Majesty Queen
Rania Al-Abdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277, 286–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that individual
government officials are eligible for immunity under the FSIA); Tannenbaum v. Rabin,
No. CV-95-4367, 1996 WL 75283, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1996) (same); Bryks v. Can.
Broad. Corp., 906 F. Supp. 204, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp.
386, 389 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
151. In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 83.
152. Id. at 84. In fact, the law generally recognizes that the “immunity of a principal
does not amount to much without the extension of that immunity to its agents.” Id. (citing
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616–17 (1972) (legislative immunity for Senate
aides); Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (judicial immunity for law clerks)).
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may constitute an “agency or instrumentality” of the state is consistent
with the terrorism exception to the FSIA, which “makes specific reference to the legal status of ‘an official, employee or agent’ of the foreign state.”153 Based on this language in the terrorism exception, the
court reasoned that Congress must have intended to include individuals in the definition of an “agency or instrumentality” of the state; if
individuals were not otherwise immune from suit under the FSIA, the
provisions in the terrorism exception that apply to individual government officials would be superfluous.154
Three years before the Second Circuit reached its decision in In
re Terrorist Attacks, the Seventh Circuit announced a divergent viewpoint on the issue of whether an individual government official is eligible for immunity as an “agency or instrumentality” of the state.155
The Fourth Circuit recently joined the Seventh Circuit.156
2. According to the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, Which Addressed
the Question in the Context of Human Rights Litigation Brought
Under the TVPA, Individual Government Officials Are Not
Eligible for Immunity Under the FSIA Because They Do Not
Constitute an Agency or Instrumentality of the State Within the
Meaning of Section 1603(b)
In 2005, the Seventh Circuit broke from the majority of circuits in
Enahoro v. Abubakar157 by holding that the FSIA’s “agency or instrumentality” language does not encompass individual government officials.158 As Judge Evans, writing for the Enahoro majority, noted, “A
courtroom in Chicago, one would think, is an unlikely place for considering a case involving seven Nigerian citizens suing an eighth
Nigerian for acts committed in Nigeria.”159 Unlikely as it was, the
court in Enahoro was tasked with evaluating a complicated and
“thorny” international human rights issue.160 In December 1983, a
military coup overthrew Nigeria’s democratically elected president,
leading to a string of military rulers, each overthrown by the next.161
153. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(c) (West Supp. 2009)). Section 1605A(c) creates a
private right of action against “any official, employee, or agent of [a listed] foreign state
while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1605A(c).
154. In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 84.
155. See infra notes 157–79 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 180–200 and accompanying text.
157. 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
158. Id. at 882.
159. Id. at 878.
160. Id. at 879.
161. See id. (detailing the history of military rule in Nigeria during the 1980s and 1990s).
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Defendant Abubakar was one such military ruler and presided over a
regime that actively curtailed civil liberties in Nigeria.162 Plaintiffs, all
pro-democracy political activists or the representatives of the estates of
pro-democracy political activists, alleged a variety of claims against
Abubakar, including “torture; arbitrary detention; cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful death.”163
Abubakar responded to the complaint by contending that he was entitled to immunity for actions taken in his official capacity as a Nigerian
governmental official and part of the ruling council.164 Underlying
his contention was the assumption that the FSIA applies to individual
officials, not just to governments and agencies.165
The Seventh Circuit rejected Abubakar’s claims of immunity
under the FSIA on the following grounds: (1) the language of the
statute indicates that it was not intended to apply to individual government officials; (2) the Chuidian court used “upside down” logic in concluding that because individuals were not explicitly excluded, they
must be included; and (3) a recent Seventh Circuit decision had held
that the FSIA similarly does not apply to heads of state.166 First, the
court explained, Section 1603(b) of the FSIA does not explicitly mention any individuals, heads of government, or high-level officials.167 If
Congress meant to provide individuals acting in the scope of their
162. Id. Abubakar was the leader of the Provisional Ruling Council (“PRC”) between
1998 and 1999. Id. The PRC was the highest governmental body throughout the various
military regimes and was chaired by the current military ruler. Id. Eventually, Nigeria held
a presidential election, and in May 1999, the regime of military rulers came to an end
when the first democratically elected President in fifteen years was sworn into office. Id.
163. Id. at 879–80. Plaintiff Abiola, the daughter of Nigerian pro-democracy activists,
asserted that Abubakar was responsible for her parents’ deaths. Id. at 879. Abiola’s father
had been a candidate for President in 1993 and challenged the election results through
the Nigerian court system, eventually declaring himself President. Id. He was then allegedly “arrested and charged with treason” and “was kept in prison under inhumane conditions, was tortured, and denied access to lawyers, doctors, and his family” for a period of
four years. Id. He died in prison. Id. Abiola’s mother, also a pro-democracy activist,
began a campaign to free her husband and called for democracy in Nigeria. Id. After
receiving threatening telephone calls, she was shot multiple times in broad daylight in
1996 and died. Id. Named plaintiff Enahoro was a political activist who played a primary
role in securing Nigeria’s independence from Great Britain in 1960. Id. at 880. In 1994, at
the age of seventy, Enahoro was arrested and imprisoned for four months, during which
time he was denied medical treatment despite being a diabetic. Id. Finally, plaintiff
Nwankwo, also a political activist, was arrested in 1998, stripped naked, flogged, and held
in custody for two months without medical treatment. Id.
164. Id. at 880.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 881–82.
167. Id. at 881.
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official capacity with FSIA immunity, it would have done so in “clear
and unmistakable terms.”168 Rather, observed the court, the statute’s
use of the phrase “separate legal person” seems to indicate that Congress did not intend to include natural persons in the statutory definition because the former phrase has the “ring of the familiar legal
concept that corporations are persons . . . subject to suit.”169 Furthermore, because the phrase “separate legal person” is followed by the
phrase “corporate or otherwise,” the court was convinced that the former refers to the concept that a business entity is treated as a legal
person.170 Second, the court found “upside down as a matter of logic”
the Chuidian court’s reasoning that because individuals were not explicitly excluded by the statute, they must be included.171 The Seventh Circuit also noted that such an approach “ignores the traditional
burden of proof on immunity issues under the FSIA.”172 Under the
FSIA, the party claiming immunity is required to make a prima facie
showing that it meets the statutory definition of a foreign state.173
The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence showing
that the claimant is not entitled to immunity, typically because it falls
within one of the FSIA exceptions.174 Under the Chuidian approach,
however, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant is not an
“agency or instrumentality” of the state, likely by showing that his conduct was outside the scope of his official capacity.175 Finally, the court
drew an analogy between the present case and a similar issue discussed in Ye v. Zemin,176 a case in which the court addressed whether
heads of state are immune from suit under the FSIA.177 According to
the court in Ye, the FSIA does not apply to heads of state because the
statute “defines a foreign state to include a political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state but makes no mention of
heads of state,” and the FSIA does not seem to subscribe to the view of
168. Id. at 881–82.
169. Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see infra note 194 and accompanying text.
171. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 882.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d 230, 241 (2d
Cir. 2002); Int’l Ins. Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.
2002); Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002)).
174. Id. at 881–82.
175. See id. (“The FSIA has been applied to individuals, but in those cases one thing is
clear: the individual must have been acting in his official capacity. If he is not, there is no
immunity.”).
176. 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004).
177. Id. at 625.
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Louis XIV that “‘L’état, c’est moi.’ ”178 Therefore, if the FSIA does
not apply to heads of state, as stated in Ye, the court reasoned that it
was even less likely that it could apply to General Abubakar, who simply served as “a member of a committee,” even if that committee “ran
the country.”179
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in its conclusion that individual government officials are not eligible for immunity as an “agency or instrumentality of the state” under the FSIA. In
Yousuf v. Samantar,180 natives of Somalia brought an action against a
former Somali government official for human rights abuses occurring
under his command.181 The Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in concluding that individual government officials are not eligible
for immunity under the FSIA.182 In October 1969, authoritarian socialist rule was successfully instituted in Somalia following a military
coup led by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (“SRC”), a group
composed primarily of Somali Army officers, including defendant Samantar.183 The SRC used Somalia’s clan system to its advantage by
giving top military and governmental positions to members of favored
clans while targeting and systematically oppressing other clans, including the well-educated and wealthy Isaaq clan, of which plaintiffs are all
178. Id. at 625 & n.7 [“I am the state.”] (author’s translation).
179. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 881.
180. 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).
181. Id. at 373–74.
182. Id. at 373. In 2004, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of when the acts of an
individual bind a foreign sovereign claiming FSIA immunity. Velasco v. Gov’t of Indon.,
370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004). Reasoning that “the act of an agent beyond what he is
legally empowered to do is not binding upon the government,” the court held that the
unauthorized acts of individual government officials did not bind the foreign government
claiming FSIA immunity. Id. at 399–400. The Velasco decision cited Chuidian to note that
many courts have held that the FSIA provides immunity to foreign officials acting within
their official authority. Id. at 398–99. For this reason, many courts and commentators
believed that Velasco represented the Fourth Circuit’s adoption of the majority viewpoint.
Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 378–79 (referencing Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 160
(2d Cir. 2007) (reading Velasco as concluding that the FSIA applies to foreign officials);
David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 99
AM. J. INT’L L. 194, 196 n.13 (2005) (including Velasco in a list of decisions holding that the
FSIA applies to individual government officials)). The Fourth Circuit maintained that Velasco did not, however, “settle the question of whether Congress intended to confer sovereign immunity under the FSIA on an individual acting within the scope of his authority.”
Id. at 379. Although Velasco referenced Chuidian and other decisions ruling on the scope
of Section 1603(b), the holding in Velasco was not, according to the Yousuf court, about
whether the FSIA provides immunity to individual government officials, but rather about
“whether the Indonesian government was bound, through agency principles, by the unauthorized acts of individual government officials.” Id.
183. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2007), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).
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members.184 In 1978, Ethiopia defeated Somalia in the Ogden War,
which, combined with a fear of growing local opposition movements,
prompted the SRC’s increasingly brutal campaign against perceived
opponents.185 That campaign used terrorism as a means to deter the
civilian population from supporting opposition movements and led to
the perpetration of numerous atrocities against the Somali people.186
These atrocities were perpetrated by “government intelligence agencies, including the National Security Service (‘NSS’) and the military
police,” who engaged in the pervasive and “systematic use of torture,
arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing.”187 Three plaintiffs alleged that they personally were victims of this brutality; the remaining
plaintiffs represented the estates of alleged victims of extrajudicial killing.188 The plaintiffs did not allege that Samantar personally participated in these atrocities, but rather, that as Minister of Defense and
later as Somali Prime Minister, Samantar tacitly approved of the actions undertaken by the NSS and the military police.189 Samantar
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit on the grounds that the
court lacked jurisdiction because he is entitled to sovereign immunity
under the FSIA.190
The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s granting of Samantar’s motion to dismiss and concluded that because the FSIA does
not apply to present or former individual government officials, Samantar is not shielded from liability.191 Judge Traxler, writing for the
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 373.
187. Id. at 374.
188. Id. Named plaintiff Yousuf alleged that he was abducted by NSS agents on suspicion of anti-governmental activity and was tortured by various methods, including electric
shock and “the Mig,” a torture technique in which a victim’s hands and feet are bound
together behind the back and a heavy rock is placed upon the back to induce great pain.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of the plaintiffs in this case participated
anonymously because they feared that they or their families would be subject to retribution
for their participation in the suit. Yousuf, 2007 WL 220579, at *4 n.8. Anonymous plaintiff
Jane Doe alleged that she was abducted by NSS agents, tortured, raped, beaten until she
was immobile, and placed in solitary confinement for a period of three and a half years.
Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 374. Anonymous plaintiff John Doe II, a former member of the Somali
National Army, alleged that he and other soldiers were arrested and shot during a mass
execution. Id. Doe survived by hiding under a pile of dead bodies. Id. Plaintiff Deria
alleged that his father and brother were abducted, tortured, and killed by Somali soldiers.
Id. Anonymous plaintiff John Doe I alleged that government forces abducted and executed his brothers. Id.
189. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 375. Samantar fled to the United States when the regime collapsed. Id. at 374.
190. Id. at 375.
191. Id. at 381.
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majority, reasoned that because the language of the FSIA does not
contain an explicit mention of individuals or natural persons, it is not
obvious that Congress intended—as the majority of circuits have
held—for individual government officials to fall within the scope of
FSIA immunity.192 In evaluating congressional intent, Judge Traxler
focused on three factors: (1) the precise language of the statute; (2)
its overall structure; and (3) its purpose, as evidenced by the congressional record.193 First, the statute’s use of the language “separate legal
person,” a common phrase in corporate law,194 suggests that Section
1603(b)’s “agency or instrumentality” language was intended to apply
to corporations or business entities, not to natural persons.195 Second, this reading of the “agency or instrumentality” language is consistent with the overall structure of the statute, particularly the Sections
addressing service of process, which do not anywhere mention service
upon individuals.196 Rather, these Sections more closely resemble
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B), which provides the procedures for service on a corporation or business entity, than Rule 4(f),
which outlines the procedures for serving an individual located in a
foreign country.197 Finally, the court found support for its conclusion
in the House Judiciary Committee Report on the FSIA, which provides
a definition and examples of a “separate legal person.”198 Neither the
definition nor the examples given in the House Report offer any indication that Congress intended for individual officials to fall within the
scope of FSIA immunity.199 For these reasons, the court concluded
that Samantar was not eligible for immunity under the FSIA.200
192. Id. at 378.
193. Id. at 379–80.
194. Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted). The phrase is typically used to “‘capture the essence of the principal of limited liability’” that results from the “‘fiction of
corporate personhood.’” Id. (quoting Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2005));
cf. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 625
(1983) (noting that the idea of “[s]eparate legal personality has been described as an almost indispensible aspect of the public corporation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
195. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1608(b) outlines service upon an
“agency or instrumentality,” noting that a copy of the summons or complaint must be sent
to an “‘officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.’” Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 1608(b) (2006)). If service must be provided to an agent, presumably the “agency or
instrumentality” language is not intended to include individuals.
197. Id. at 381; FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f).
198. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra text accompanying notes 90–92.
199. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381; see supra text accompanying note 86.
200. Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381. The court also concluded that even if the FSIA were to
apply to individual government officials, it does not apply to former government officials.

R
R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR303.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 27

25-MAY-10

A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH

13:20

613

In cases such as Enahoro and Yousuf, in which courts considered
defenses of sovereign immunity in the context of human rights
abuses, plaintiffs’ claims have generally been brought under the Torture Victim Protection Act.201 While the FSIA provides the jurisdictional basis for bringing suit against a foreign state, the TVPA provides
the necessary cause of action for plaintiffs pursuing claims that they
were injured by torture abroad.202
D. When Invoked by Defendants in the Human Rights Context, the
FSIA Often Confronts Claims Brought by Plaintiffs Under the
TVPA
Congress enacted the TVPA203 to provide a civil redress to victims
of torture. Because a state that practices torture and extrajudicial killing is unlikely to adhere to the rule of law, judicial protections against
human rights violations are least effective in those countries where
protections are most needed.204 Countries that are “scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights” often suffer the “general collapse of [their] democratic [and judicial] institutions.”205 The TVPA
provides a cause of action for individuals injured in that sort of
circumstance.
The TVPA provides that “[a]n individual who, under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects
an individual to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing” is liable for civil
damages to the victim or the victim’s representative.206 Six features of
the TVPA are particularly important. First, the statute provides that
Id. This conclusion was supported by several factors. First, the Supreme Court’s holding
in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson indicates that the “plain text” of the statute, “because it is
expressed in the present tense, requires that instrumentality status be determined at the
time the suit is filed.” 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003). Second, case law favors a strong presumption that identical words used in the same sentence of a statute have the same meaning.
Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 382. Third, the purpose of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
“has never been to permit foreign states and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct
in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit,” but rather “to give foreign
states . . . some present protection from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity.”
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Judge Traxler, even if the FSIA shields current individual government
officials from suit, because Samantar is no longer a Somali government official, and was
not at the time that plaintiffs brought action, he is not entitled to immunity. Yousuf, 552
F.3d at 383.
201. See infra Part II.D.
202. See infra Part II.D.
203. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
204. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
205. Id.
206. § 2, 106 Stat. at 73.
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only individuals, not foreign states, may be sued.207 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report makes special note of the fact that defendants
may be sued only if a court in the United States has personal jurisdiction over them, so that the TVPA will “not turn the U.S. courts into
tribunals” for the world.208 Second, the phrase “under actual or apparent authority” requires that the plaintiff establish some governmental involvement.209 Third, the definitions of “torture” and
“extrajudicial killing” used in the TVPA are derived from international standards.210 Fourth, the TVPA only creates a cause of action
for victims of torture or extrajudicial killing or their legal representatives in cases in which the victim is not alive to bring suit.211 Fifth, the
TVPA provides that a court shall refuse to hear a claim if the defendant establishes that the claimant has not exhausted “adequate and
available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the
claim occurred.”212 This requirement is designed to prevent U.S.
courts from intruding into cases that would be more appropriately
handled by courts in the location where the killing or torture alleg-

207. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4; see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (“The
legislation uses the term ‘individual’ to make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only individuals may be
sued.”). The statute is not, therefore, “meant to override” the FSIA, which provides immunity for foreign governments and their entities. Id.
208. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945) (providing the “minimum contacts” standard for obtaining personal jurisdiction);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1984) (same)).
209. § 2, 106 Stat. at 73; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (“The bill does not attempt
to deal with torture or killing by purely private groups.”). The House Judiciary Committee
Report recommends that courts look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to construe the “color of law”
language and draw from agency law to interpret the “actual or apparent authority” language in the statute. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4–5. The definition of torture in the TVPA is limited to
acts “by which severe pain or suffering . . . whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted . . . for such purposes as obtaining . . . information or a confession, . . . punish[ment], intimidati[on], coer[cion], or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind.” § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 73. This language “tracks the definition” of torture adopted
in Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4. The TVPA defines extrajudicial killing as “a
deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by
civilized peoples,” and excludes any execution, which “under international law, is lawfully
carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.” § 3(a), 106 Stat. at 73. The definition
is based on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5.
211. § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 73.
212. § 2(b), 106 Stat. at 73.
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edly occurred.213 Finally, a ten year statute of limitations prevents the
courts from hearing “stale” claims.214
The TVPA is not a jurisdictional statute.215 Rather, its cause of
action must be paired with a jurisdictional grounding.216 Presumably,
if an individual government official qualifies as an “agency or instrumentality” of the state under the FSIA, because the FSIA is the sole
method for gaining jurisdiction over a “foreign state,” the human
rights claim would be barred.217
III.

ANALYSIS

Holding, as the majority of circuits have held, that an individual
government official acting in his official capacity constitutes a “foreign
state” for purposes of FSIA immunity may have wide-reaching implications for plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate human rights claims in this

213. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (noting that this requirement avoids the
imposition of additional burdens on the American judicial economy while also stimulating
the development of “meaningful remedies” in other countries).
214. § 2(c), 106 Stat. at 73. But see H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (noting that for cases in
which a defendant has concealed his or her identity or hidden from the plaintiff, equitable
tolling remedies may preserve the plaintiff’s claim beyond ten years).
215. See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that the TVPA
allows “appellants to pursue their claims of official torture [only] under the jurisdiction”
conferred by another relevant federal statute).
216. Jurisdiction may be brought under either the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006), or the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Kadic, 70
F.3d at 246; see also Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1257 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that
§ 1331 is the appropriate jurisdictional basis for the TVPA). The ATS provides district
courts with original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. To
summarize, the ATS “confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction” if (1) an alien brings suit,
(2) for a tort, (3) “committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law).”
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. The ATS does not create any causes of action, but rather was “enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). The TVPA represents an additional cause of action that may be brought under the ATS.
217. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)
(holding that the FSIA is the sole method for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in
federal court). To be clear, the logic above is as follows: (1) if an individual government
official constitutes an “agency or instrumentality” of a foreign state, they meet the statutory
definition of a “foreign state”; (2) “foreign states” are immune from suit in federal court
unless one of the FSIA exceptions applies; (3) because there is no explicit exception for
cases involving human rights allegations, a “foreign state” (which may be an individual
person) accused of human rights violations is immune from suit under the FSIA; (4) if the
foreign state is immune, and the FSIA is the sole method for obtaining subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign state, the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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country.218 Such a conclusion may be acceptable in a variety of other
factual contexts, such as those encountered by some of the courts in
the majority of circuits ruling on this issue.219 In the context of
human rights litigation brought under the TVPA, where a far different set of values are at stake, this proposition is unacceptable.220 Without requiring statutory amendment,221 the circuit split could be
resolved in a manner favorable to human rights litigants if the majority position on the question of whether an individual government official is eligible for immunity under the FSIA were adopted as the
general rule, excepting situations in which claims of human rights

218. Cf. Jennifer Correale, Comment, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital Contribution
to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 197, 199
(1994) (“Whether the [TVPA] will be successful in adjudicating the claims of human rights
victims depends very much on the alleviation of its doctrinal and practical limitations.”).
219. See supra Part II.C.1. In other words, cases pertaining to banking, commercial, and
industrial transactions, such as those addressed by the Ninth, District of Columbia, Sixth,
and Fifth Circuits, involve interests altogether different than those presented to the Seventh and Fourth Circuits in ruling on the issue of whether an individual government official is entitled to immunity. The Second Circuit, in addressing a terrorism-related claim,
was, like the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, confronted with a human rights element. For a
more lengthy discussion of the implications of the issues confronted by the Second Circuit,
see infra note 232.
220. See infra Part III.C.
221. Creation of a statutory FSIA exception for human rights has proven problematic.
Three legislative proposals have attempted to add an exception to the FSIA that would
allow American courts to hear lawsuits against foreign sovereigns for human rights violations. First, in 1991, Congressman Lawrence J. Smith proposed an amendment that would
have incorporated the language of the TVPA into the FSIA. H.R. 2357, 102d Cong. (1991).
Later that year, Congressman Smith reintroduced a more limited amendment that would
have created an exception for situations in which an American citizen was injured by tortious acts arising out of employment contracts with a foreign corporation and was designed
to overturn the Supreme Court’s holding in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. 137 CONG. REC.
11,169–70 (1991) (statement of Rep. Smith); see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
351–53 (1993) (holding that the defendant state was entitled to sovereign immunity under
the FSIA for alleged acts of detention and torture of a United States citizen arising out of
his employment in a foreign country despite the fact that he had been recruited for that
position in the United States). Finally, in 1993, Senators Charles Schumer and Frank Pallone introduced a bill similar to that of Congressman Smith’s 1991 bill that also included
war crimes as a possible element of exemption. 139 CONG. REC. 12,314 (1993) (statement
of Sen. Schumer regarding the proposed legislation). See generally David J. Bederman, Dead
Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 282–84 (1996) (outlining a variety of proposals to add a human
rights exception to the FSIA); Jeffrey Jacobson, Comment, Trying to Fit a Square Peg Into a
Round Hole: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 WHITTIER L.
REV. 757, 773–75 (1998) (same). At least one scholar believes that given the difficulty of
amending the FSIA, creation of an independent bill that focuses only on a human rights
exception would be useful. Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human
Rights Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 35, 65
(1998).
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abuse are brought under the TVPA.222 Such a standard would place
the majority’s presumption of immunity for individual government officials in line with congressional intent in enacting the TVPA,223 remedy concerns that contemporary use of the FSIA, particularly in the
context of human rights, has not adhered to the congressional goal of
removing the role of the political branches in immunity decisionmaking,224 and acknowledge the fundamental difference between the implications of granting foreign sovereign immunity in the context of
human rights litigation and the granting of such immunity as “a matter of comity” in other contexts.225
A. Recognizing an Exception for Cases Brought Under the TVPA Could
Resolve the Present Circuit Split and Would Place the Doctrine
in Line with the Intent of Congress in Enacting the
TVPA
This Comment proposes reading the FSIA as exempting individual government officials from liability for acts taken in their official
capacity except when challenges to those acts are brought under the
TVPA. Such a reading (1) explains and could resolve the circuit split
as to whether an individual government official constitutes an “agency
or instrumentality” of the state under the FSIA,226 (2) conforms statutory interpretation of the FSIA to the congressional motivations behind enactment of the TVPA,227 and (3) addresses the problems with
holding that the TVPA applies only in those instances in which an
existing FSIA exception applies.228
1. A Reading of the FSIA that Includes an Exception for Cases
Brought Against Individual Government Officials Under the
TVPA Explains and Could Resolve the Current FSIA
Circuit Split
Congress enacted the TVPA in 1991 in recognition of the epidemic of torture around the world229 and did not intend that the FSIA
222. See infra Part III.A–C.
223. See infra Part III.A.
224. See infra Part III.B.
225. See infra Part III.C.
226. See infra Part III.A.1.
227. See infra Part III.A.2.
228. See infra Part III.A.3.
229. Rachael E. Schwartz, “And Tomorrow?” The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 271, 273 (1994). Interestingly, the TVPA does not apply to torture perpetrated by the United States. Id. at 273 n.5. See generally Leland H. Kynes, Note, Letting the
CAT Out of the Bag: Providing a Civil Right of Action for Torture Committed by U.S. Officials
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would provide immunity to individual government officials in cases in
which human rights claims were alleged under the TVPA.230 The exception proposed by this Comment not only accounts for the different
results reached by the majority and minority of courts in the present
circuit split, but also could resolve the circuit split entirely. First, in
reviewing the cases falling on either side of the circuit split, one thing
seems clear—the majority and minority confronted the question of
whether an individual government official constitutes an “agency or
instrumentality” of the state in different contexts.231 None of the
cases confronted by the majority involved human rights claims
brought under the TVPA. Rather, Chuidian, El-Fadl, Byrd, Keller, and
In re Terrorist Attacks respectively addressed claims based on the following: (1) a state bank’s refusal to make payment on a letter of credit;
(2) employment termination-related tort claims; (3) an illegal plan to
remove the plaintiff from his employment management position; (4)
a financial scam resulting in the loss of a large sum of money; and (5)
the provision of funds to charities, allegedly with the knowledge that
such funds would eventually be transferred to terrorist organizations.232 The minority, however, confronted the question in the
Abroad, An Obligation of the Convention Against Torture?, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 187, 214,
219 (2005) (noting that because the TVPA applies only to individuals acting under the
authority of a foreign nation, the statute may not be invoked against domestic officials, and
arguing in favor of “[p]roviding a civil right of action for foreign victims of torture committed by U.S. officials” according to the standards that appear in the TVPA).
230. Brief of United States Member of Congress and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 6,
Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1893).
231. See supra Part II.C.
232. See supra Part II.C.1. Terrorist actions undoubtedly implicate human rights, and
this Comment should not be construed as suggesting otherwise. See Michael A. Newton,
Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323,
325 (2009) (“Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes . . . perhaps the most
pernicious threat to the fundamental human rights of private, peace-loving citizens.”).
The plaintiffs in In re Terrorist Attacks pursued their claims under the common law of torts.
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied
sub nom. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009). In addition to
holding that the Four Princes were entitled to FSIA immunity for acts undertaken in their
official capacity as members of various governing bodies, the Second Circuit also concluded that the terrorism exception to the FSIA, which grants jurisdiction to federal courts
for cases brought by American citizens against foreign governments seeking damages for,
inter alia, providing material support for terrorist actions, was inapplicable in this case. Id.
at 88–89; see also supra text accompanying notes 149–50 (discussing the court’s grant of
immunity to the Four Princes); supra note 106 (describing the requirements for proceeding under the FSIA terrorism exception). The court also concluded that applying the FSIA
torts exception when the alleged conduct amounts to terrorism would “evade and frustrate” the terrorism exception, which applies only when the state in question has been
designated a state sponsor of terrorism. In re Terrorist Attacks, 538 F.3d at 89; see supra note
106. In re Terrorist Attacks serves, therefore, as a useful example of the inherent limitations

R
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course of human rights litigation that was either brought under the
TVPA, or that should have been brought under the TVPA.233 The
different factual circumstances confronted by the majority and minority of courts may, therefore, help to explain why they reached such
different results. Where claims of human rights abuse were brought
under the TVPA, or another relevant statute, the courts of appeals
concluded that individual government officials are not eligible for immunity.234 Where other sorts of non-TVPA claims were brought
against individual government officials, the courts of appeals concluded that those officials were entitled to immunity under the
FSIA.235 Given the different interests at stake in each kind of litigation, such results seem reasonable.236 This circuit split could be resolved by acknowledging that factual distinction. Recognizing the
exception proposed by this Comment would do just that.
2. Recognizing an Exception to the Doctrine of Immunity for
Individual Government Officials in Cases Brought Under the
TVPA Would Conform the Interpretation of the FSIA to
Congress’s Motivations in Enacting the TVPA
Statutes are not interpreted “in isolation,” but rather in the context of each other, including later-enacted statutes.237 Recognizing a
doctrine in which individual government officials are presumptively
immune from suit except where suit is brought under the TVPA is
therefore strongly supported by (1) congressional ratification of the
Convention Against Torture, and enactment of the TVPA in response,
of the FSIA terrorism exception. If a state is not designated a “state sponsor of terrorism,”
the FSIA, by and large, operates as a bar to human rights litigation against that state. See
infra Part III.A.3. This Comment proposes an exception that would prevent the FSIA from
barring human rights litigation brought under the TVPA. Unfortunately, the TVPA, unlike the FSIA terrorism exception, does not create a cause of action against states or individual government officials accused of providing material support to terrorist
organizations. While this author strongly supports the creation of a mechanism that would
allow victims of human rights abuse, including victims of terrorism, to seek remedy in
American courts, this Comment focuses solely on claims brought under the TVPA.
233. The plaintiffs in Enahoro originally pled under the ATS. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408
F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 2005). The court determined, however, that the TVPA “occup[ies]
the field,” and that the plaintiffs were therefore required to plead under the specific standards of the TVPA rather than under the common law of nations as described in the ATS.
Id. at 884–85.
234. See supra Part II.C.2.
235. See supra Part II.C.1.
236. See infra Part III.C; see also supra note 232 (noting that In re Terrorist Attacks highlights a unique human rights issue, but one that is, quite unfortunately, outside of the
scope of both the TVPA and this Comment).
237. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (referring to this idea as the “most rudimentary rule of statutory construction”).
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(2) the plain text of the TVPA, (3) explicit statements in the TVPA’s
congressional record, and (4) limitations built into the TVPA that expressly narrow the field of claims that may be brought under its auspices so that such a doctrine would not unduly burden the judicial
economy. First, in 1990, the United States Senate ratified the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,238 an initiative taken in response to the fact that, despite international condemnation, many of
the world’s governments continue to engage in, condone, or tolerate
torture.239 The Convention obligated signatories to adopt measures
that would ensure that torturers be held legally accountable for their
acts, such as the provision of a means of civil redress to torture victims.240 Offering a forum in which human rights abusers may be held
legally accountable for their actions is particularly valuable because
“[j]udicial protections . . . are often least effective in those countries
where such abuses are most prevalent.”241 In the case of Yousuf v.
Samantar, for example, had plaintiffs not been afforded the opportunity to litigate their case in American courts under the TVPA, it seems
unlikely that they would have had access to an alternative forum because, during the very coup that placed Samantar in power, the Somali Supreme Court was abolished.242 The TVPA was designed to
address such concerns by providing a cause of action against individuals who, acting under actual or apparent authority, or under color of
law, perpetrated acts of torture.243 Because the TVPA was intended to
provide a means of civil redress to victims of torture, as required by
the Convention Against Torture, it seems unlikely that Congress
would have understood the FSIA as granting individual government
officials immunity.244 If the FSIA were read as granting immunity to
individual government officials, it would provide immunity to the very
238. Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
239. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1
2007) (“The SRC suspended the existing Constitution, closed the National Assembly, abolished the Supreme Court and declared all groups not sponsored by the government . . . to
be illegal.”), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).
243. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
244. See Brief of United States Member of Congress and Law Professors as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 3,
Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1893) (arguing that construing
the FSIA as a jurisdictional bar to a TVPA claim is contrary to congressional intent and will
prevent the TVPA from achieving the goals that Congress designed it to achieve).
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class of defendants against whom the TVPA provides a cause of action—effectively denying plaintiffs bringing suit under the TVPA an
opportunity to seek redress.245
Second, the plain text of the TVPA states that only an individual is
subject to liability, a word chosen to “make crystal clear” that the bill
applies not to foreign states or their entities, but only to individuals.246
The phrase “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law” also
indicates that only individuals with some governmental involvement
are liable under the statute.247 In other words, those persons liable
for suit under the TVPA are precisely those “individual government
officials” at issue in the present circuit split. Therefore, if only individuals with “some governmental involvement” are eligible for suit under
the TVPA, an interpretation of the FSIA that grants immunity to individual government officials even in human rights cases brought under
the TVPA essentially makes the legislation a nullity.248 For the TVPA’s
cause of action against individual government officials to have real
meaning, those individual government officials must not be able to
escape liability by invoking FSIA immunity.249
Third, the congressional record for the TVPA, particularly with
respect to how it relates to the FSIA, is informative.250 The Senate
245. See Schwartz, supra note 229, at 303 (“[T]he TVPA authorizes only actions against
individuals, not states. Thus, the FSIA should be irrelevant and should not make sovereign
immunity available [to defendants] in a TVPA case.”).
246. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7.
247. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5 (1991).
248. See Brief of Torture Survivors Support Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 2, Yousuf,
552 F.3d 371 (No. 07-1893) (arguing that an approach that grants immunity to individual
government officials would “effectively eviscerate the TVPA”).
249. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The Claim to Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Individuals Sued for
International Human Rights Violations, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 465, 466 (1994) (arguing that
because the TVPA requires proof that the defendant acted under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, if the FSIA were to be applied to individual government officials, it
would serve as a “categorical bar” to suits alleging human rights violations under the
TVPA); see also Brief of Professors of International Litigation and Foreign Relations Law as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 19–20, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49
(2009) (No. 08-1555) (arguing that a reading of the FSIA that includes individual officials
creates an “unnecessary” conflict between the TVPA and the FSIA); Brief for the Respondents at 28, Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (No. 08-1555) (noting that excluding individual officials
from the FSIA would “give[ ] coherence” to the TVPA).
250. In numerous cases involving FSIA interpretation, courts have shown their willingness to defer to the intent of Congress. See G. Michael Ziman, Comment, Holding Foreign
Governments Accountable for Their Human Rights Abuses: A Proposed Amendment to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 185, 208–09 (1999) (surveying cases). A similar deference should exist in cases involving application of both the FSIA
and the TVPA such that reviewing the congressional history of the TVPA may be useful in
understanding the FSIA. If a human rights exception to the FSIA existed, this analysis
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Judiciary Committee Report notes that because the TVPA makes explicit use of the term “individual,” it is not meant to override the FSIA,
which Congress read as rendering foreign governments, and not individuals, immune from suit in American courts, subject to limited exceptions.251 The House Judiciary Committee Report adds, however,
that the TVPA is “subject to restrictions” in the FSIA—a statement that
has caused no small amount of confusion.252 Some courts have used
that language to justify their conclusion that individual government
officials sued under the TVPA may be entitled to immunity.253 Because the TVPA applies only to individual government officials, and
the House Judiciary Committee Report describes the FSIA as providing immunity only to foreign states or their “agencies or instrumentalities,” it is not entirely clear what is meant by “subject to restrictions.”
What is clear, however, is that neither the Senate Report nor the
House Report indicates that the FSIA is understood as depriving the
TVPA of the jurisdiction upon which a viable claim under the statute
depends. Rather, the very opposite seems true. Senator Specter, the
original sponsor of the TVPA, in discussing that legislation with Senator Grassley, specifically noted that “‘the FSIA would not normally
provide a defense to an action’” brought under the TVPA.254 Senator
Specter’s statement should be seen as providing particularly compelling insight into the intent of Congress in enacting the TVPA.255
would be substantially simpler. Cf. id. at 211 (arguing that if Congress chose to create a
human rights exception to the FSIA, the Court would approach it with deference under
the political question doctrine).
251. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7.
252. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5; see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act
of 1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 491, 512
(1993) (“The drafters of the TVPA have offered confusing guidance as to how it should be
reconciled with the FSIA.”).
253. See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *12 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 1, 2007) (citing the “subject to restrictions” language as evidence that the legislative
history of the TVPA does not necessarily require the court to conclude that the TVPA
forecloses granting sovereign immunity to individual government officials under the FSIA
(internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 49 (2009).
254. Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 177, 187 (1994) (citing and quoting 138 CONG. REC. S2668 (daily ed.
Mar. 3, 1992) (statement of Sen. Specter)). Senator Specter has recently indicated that
extension of FSIA immunity to individual government officials would be “contrary to Congress’s intent to provide redress for egregious acts that infringe human rights” through the
TVPA, and that “extending FSIA immunity to foreign government officials responsible for
torture would effectively nullify the TVPA.” Brief of Senator Arlen Specter et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (No. 08-1555).
255. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526–27 (1982) (“[R]emarks . . .
of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted . . . are an authoritative guide to the
statute’s construction.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
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Finally, the TVPA contains five internal limitations that prevent it
from gravely burdening judicial economy—a concern that might arise
were the FSIA read to include an exception for the immunity of individual government officials in cases where claims are brought under
the TVPA. First, a claim may not be brought under the TVPA unless
the claimant has “exhausted adequate and available remedies” in the
place where the alleged conduct occurred.256 This limitation prevents
American courts from interfering in a case that would be “more appropriately handled” by the court in the country in which the alleged
conduct occurred, and therefore avoids imposing an unnecessary burden on American courts and encourages the development of meaningful remedies in other countries.257 Second, a ten year statute of
limitations balances two interests by simultaneously guaranteeing that
federal courts will not have to hear “stale claims” and providing that
claims may be equitably tolled in cases in which a defendant has fraudulently concealed his or her location or identification.258 Third, the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report emphasizes that TVPA claims may
be brought only against those individuals who actually “ordered, abetted, or assisted” the perpetration of torture, and not against leaders
for “an isolated act of torture [that] occurred somewhere in that
country.”259 Fourth, to prevent American courts from becoming
“tribunals for torts having no connection to the United States whatsoever,” the TVPA permits claims only against those defendants over
whom the court has personal jurisdiction.260 Finally, because the
TVPA is not designed to override traditional diplomatic or head of
state immunity, claims against visiting diplomats and heads of state are
not governed by its provisions.261 Because of these internal limitations, permitting suits against individual government officials accused
TION:

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1000–01 (4th ed. 2007) (“Next to
committee reports, the most persuasive legislative materials are explanations of statutory
meanings, and compromises reached to achieve enactment, by the sponsors and floor
managers of the legislation.”).
256. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); see also supra text accompanying note 212 (discussing the “adequate and available remedies” requirement).
257. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5.
258. Id.
259. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8–9 (1991). The official need not have performed the torture personally or directly ordered its perpetration, but only need to have “authorized,
tolerated or knowingly ignored” the abuse. Id. at 9.
260. Id. at 7; see supra note 208 (discussing the personal jurisdiction standard).
261. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7–8. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign
and Individual Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity)—Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 475–78 (1999) (outlining
the common-law head of state and diplomatic immunity doctrines).
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of human rights abuses under the TVPA (without the bar of FSIA immunity) would not dramatically and unduly burden judicial
economy.262
3. Restricting the TVPA to Cases in Which an Exception to the FSIA
Has Been Met Renders the Statute Virtually Useless, Given the
Difficulties in Squeezing Claims of Human Rights Abuse into One
of the Existing Exceptions to FSIA Immunity
Some courts have held that in order for the TVPA to apply, a
plaintiff’s claim must fit into one of the existing exceptions to FSIA
immunity.263 Such a finding is problematic because it is almost impossible for human rights plaintiffs bringing suit under the TVPA to invoke any of the existing FSIA exceptions successfully.264 First,
interpretation of the property exceptions indicates that they are likely
to be too limited in scope to apply.265 Second, the arbitration exception does not seem to be applicable in human rights cases.266 Third,
because the non-commercial torts exception requires that the alleged
conduct have occurred in the United States, and the TVPA creates a
cause of action for victims of torture perpetrated abroad, that exception is likewise inapplicable.267 Fourth, the terrorism exception, while
promising for human rights litigants, is limited to only a small group
of states that have been designated “state sponsors of terrorism” by the

262. See Brief for the Respondents at 57–58, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009)
(No. 08-1555) (arguing that “no such flood [of cases has occurred] in the two decades
since the TVPA was enacted, nor could there be” given the many limitations on bringing
suit under the TVPA). But see Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that given the “countless human rights cases that might well be
brought,” such an “expansive reading” of the FSIA would place an “enormous strain” upon
federal courts).
263. See, e.g., Mater v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that if
a FSIA exception applies, an individual government official acting in his official capacity
may be sued under the TVPA; if no such exception applies, U.S. courts lack jurisdiction),
aff’d, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009); Belhas v. Ya‘alon, 466 F. Supp. 2d 127, 131 (D.D.C. 2006)
(same), aff’d, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
264. Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT’L 403, 415 (1995).
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)–(4) (2006) (property exceptions); Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 233, 234 (2005).
266. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (arbitration exception). But see Alford, supra note 265,
at 234 (outlining a possible scheme for using the arbitration exception to the FSIA to
secure accountability for gross violations of human rights by sovereigns and their agents).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (non-commercial torts exception); Alford, supra note
265, at 234 (noting that “most human rights abuses are extraterritorial”).
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State Department.268 Fifth, the commercial activities exception normally does not assist a TVPA plaintiff because its “direct effect” requirement is not met by an individual’s continued suffering in the
United States.269 Finally, although numerous commentators have argued in favor of using the waiver exception by classifying a violation of
a jus cogens norm—such as the norm against torture—as an implied
waiver of FSIA immunity,270 such a theory has unfortunately not
found favor with the courts.271 If the case of human rights plaintiffs
under the FSIA exceptions is so “hopeless,”272 an interpretation that
bars all suits against individual officials that do not fall within a FSIA
exception effectively bars all suits under the TVPA.
268. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A (West Supp. 2009) (terrorism exception); see also supra
note 106 (detailing the requirements for going forward under the FSIA’s terrorism
exception).
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activities exception); Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding no jurisdiction over a suit
brought by a Holocaust survivor against the German government because the plaintiff’s
continued suffering in the United States did not constitute a “direct effect” for purposes of
applying the commercial activities exception); Martin v. Republic of South Africa, 836 F.2d
91, 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that although the African-American plaintiff suffered a
permanent injury from being refused treatment in a South African hospital, no “direct
effect” existed simply because the plaintiff remained affected by the injury upon his return
to the United States).
270. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (waiver exception); Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 394 (1989) (arguing that the FSIA’s implied waiver provision “provides U.S. [c]ourts with jurisdiction over torts in violation of peremptory norms of
international law”); Michelle Fastiggi, Note, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity—A Jurisdictional Shield for Foreign Nations and Their Accountability for Human Rights Violations, Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993), 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 387, 395–96 (1994) (commenting that the waiver exception could be a valid means of pursuing human rights claims in
American courts); Scott A. Richman, Comment, Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Argentina: Can the FSIA Grant Immunity for Violations of Jus Cogens Norms?, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
967, 994 (1993) (“Simply stated, the FSIA should be interpreted to read that a party impliedly waives his sovereign immunity if he commits acts which violate peremptory
norms.”); cf. Graham Ogilvy, Note, Belhas v. Ya’alon: The Case for a Jus Cogens Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 195 (2009) (arguing in favor of
recognizing a full jus cogens exception to FSIA immunity).
271. See, e.g., Princz, 26 F.2d at 1174 (holding that in order for Germany to have been
eligible to be sued under the FSIA waiver exception, it would need to have “indicated . . . a
willingness to waive immunity for [any] actions arising out of the Nazi” era’s horrors);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718–19 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the FSIA waiver exception does not provide an exception for the implied waiver of
immunity by violating jus cogens norms). But see Princz, 26 F.2d at 1182 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing strongly in favor of an implied waiver exception for violations of jus cogens
norms based on the notion that “when a state thumbs its nose at such a norm, in effect
overriding the collective will of the entire international community, the state cannot be
performing a sovereign act entitled to immunity”).
272. Reimann, supra 264, at 416.
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Recognizing a Human Rights Exception to the Majority’s
Interpretation of the FSIA’s “Agency or Instrumentality” Language
for Cases Brought Under the TVPA Would Remedy Concerns that
Present Application of the FSIA by Courts Has Not Adhered to
Congress’s Separation of Powers Goal

When Congress created the FSIA, it was with the intent that the
statute would codify the existing theory of restrictive immunity and
transfer the task of making sovereign immunity determinations from
the Executive Branch to the judiciary.273 This transfer of power to the
courts was based on the rationale that the Executive Branch, if vested
with immunity decisionmaking power, could be swayed too easily by
potentially unrelated political considerations.274 Under the FSIA,
therefore, suggestions of immunity from the State Department are not
to be used as binding determinations of immunity.275 Present application of the FSIA, particularly in the human rights context, has, however, raised concerns that the Executive Branch continues to wield
great influence through its use of suggestions of immunity.276
Yousuf v. Samantar provides two instructive examples of the way in
which district courts have continued to defer to the Executive Branch
in immunity decisionmaking. First, the district court in Yousuf stayed
the proceedings for two years to determine whether the State Department intended to provide the court with a statement of interest regarding defendant Samantar’s assertion of immunity.277 The length
of time that the court waited to hear from the State Department indicates that the court viewed such a statement as dispositive. Second,
having never received such a statement from the State Department,
the court, in holding that Samantar was eligible for FSIA immunity,
273. See supra Part II.B.1.
274. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 16 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 71, 81 (1998); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7, 9 (1976) (discussing the importance of ensuring that decisions are
made on “purely legal grounds”).
275. Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990).
276. See supra note 76; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-900, at 3 (1992) (noting that in Nelson v.
Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), rev’d, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), vacated, 996 F.2d
270 (11th Cir. 1993), the State Department filed a brief on behalf of Saudi Arabia requesting that the Supreme Court overturn the lower court’s decision that had permitted a U.S.
citizen to bring suit against Saudi Arabia for human rights violations that allegedly occurred while he was employed by a Saudi Arabian company).
277. Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2007), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009). Despite the
fact that motions were filed by both parties in the two year interim in which the court
awaited a State Department statement of interest, no hearings were held for the very reason that the court was awaiting such a statement. Id. at *6 n.10.
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relied heavily on two letters sent by the Transitional Government of
Somalia, each of which argued that because Samantar was acting in
the scope of his official capacity, he must be entitled to foreign sovereign immunity.278 In basing its decision, in large part, on the letters
sent on behalf of a foreign government, the district court bowed to
the very political pressures that the FSIA was designed to prevent and
deferred to possible, albeit unannounced, concerns of the Executive
Branch.279 Even without filing a statement of interest, the Executive
Branch had a seemingly large impact on the district court’s decision
in Yousuf, if only because the court, ostensibly operating against the
original intent of the FSIA, was worried about the potential impact of
its decision on foreign affairs.280
Recognizing a limited exception in cases in which claims are
brought under the TVPA would adhere to the FSIA’s original goal of
278. Id. at *11. The court found support for placing great weight on the letters of a
foreign sovereign from two district court decisions factually similar to Yousuf. Id. at *10. In
Belhas v. Ya‘alon, suit was brought under the TVPA in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia against an Israeli general (Ya‘alon) for war crimes, extrajudicial
killing, crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 466 F. Supp. 2d 127, 128 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In
reaching the conclusion that the defendant’s actions were undertaken in his official capacity, and therefore entitled him to immunity, the court placed great weight on letters received from the State of Israel that stated that (1) the State had approved of the
defendant’s actions, and (2) suing Ya‘alon for such conduct would amount to suit against
the state itself. Id. at 131–32. Similar TVPA claims were made against defendant Dichter, a
former director of the Israeli General Security Service, in Matar v. Dichter, a case brought
before the Southern District of New York. 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d,
563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009). The court in Matar placed “‘great weight’” on letters received
from the then-Israeli ambassador to the United States urging that the defendant be
granted immunity for the acts alleged because they were undertaken in his official capacity. Id. at 291. Based on the heavy weight accorded to these letters, the court held that
Dichter was entitled to FSIA immunity. Id. The Eastern District of Virginia noted in Yousuf
that perhaps the claim to immunity was even stronger than in Matar or Belhas because
Yousuf was a cabinet-level officer at the time that the alleged acts were undertaken. Yousuf,
2007 WL 2220579, at *11.
279. Brief of Torture Survivors Support Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 11–12, Yousuf v.
Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-1893). The district court in Yousuf seemed
particularly concerned about the foreign affairs implications of its decision despite the
absence of commentary from the State Department on the matter. See Yousuf, 2007 WL
2220579, at *11 (describing the letters from the Somali government as having a “persuas[ive]” effect on the court’s ultimate decision).
280. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 9, 19 (2009) (“In our view, Matar marks
an unfortunate return to the pre-FSIA common law regime of executive discretion in determining foreign sovereign immunity—a regime characterized by unprincipled conferrals
of immunity based on the political preferences of the presidential administration and caseby-case diplomatic pressures.”). A similar thing could be said for the district court’s approach in Yousuf.
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transferring immunity decisionmaking power from the political
branches to the judiciary. Such an exception would allow courts,
faced with allegations of human rights abuse, to determine whether a
viable claim against an individual government official exists under the
TVPA, and as such, whether FSIA immunity should be denied to the
defendant.281 Under this scheme, in which the judiciary makes immunity determinations independently, the Executive Branch is freed
both from the political pressures it would encounter were it required
to make such a decision and from any potentially adverse consequences that could result if it refused to support the immunity claim
of the pressuring state.282 Private litigants would also be assured that
their claims were being addressed on purely legal grounds by the
courts—neutral, non-politically motivated arbiters—and not subject
to diplomatic pressures.283
This exception would also advance the FSIA’s original purpose by
sparing the State Department from some of the pressures inherent in
handling human rights litigation. Because obtaining a judicial remedy abroad is often impossible given the uncooperativeness of the foreign state, American citizens seeking redress for human rights
violations enlist the assistance of the State Department to obtain a
remedy through diplomatic channels.284 In such a circumstance, the
State Department must play two roles—operating, on the one hand,
as the defender of the human rights of American citizens, and on the
other hand, in its traditional role as a “conciliator” tasked with maintaining positive foreign relations.285 This places the State Department
in the uncomfortable position of potentially being forced to choose
between supporting an American citizen wishing to challenge human
rights violations in court and protecting sensitive matters of foreign
policy and ensuring positive foreign relations.286 “Rather than hiding
behind the shield of diluted, convoluted statutory schemes,” the
United States must develop a “consistent foreign-policy framework for
281. See generally supra text accompanying notes 206–14 (outlining the requirements for
causes of action under the TVPA).
282. Brief of United States Member of Congress and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal of the District Court’s Decision at 15,
Yousuf, 552 F.3d 371 (No. 07-1893).
283. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9 (1976) (noting that the FSIA was intended to address that precise concern).
284. See Re, supra note 1, at 588 (noting that it is often difficult to obtain a “[j]udicial
remed[y] . . . in countries where torture is prevalent” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
285. Id. at 588 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 802.
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dealing” with human rights litigation in federal courts.287 Determining that all individual government officials accused of perpetrating serious human rights violations under the TVPA would be excepted
from the general presumption of immunity for individual government
officials would establish such a framework. Because it eliminates immunity for the subset of individual government officials accused of
human rights abuses, such a doctrine removes the State Department
from the uncomfortable position it faces when presented with human
rights concerns.288 It also provides a judicial remedy to citizens
harmed by human rights violations, rendering resort to diplomatic
remedies unnecessary.289
C. Recognizing an Exception for Litigation Brought Under the TVPA
Would Acknowledge that Fundamentally Different Values Are at
Stake in Cases Where Human Rights Litigation Is Barred by a
Defendant’s Invocation of FSIA Immunity and in Cases in Which
Immunity Is Granted as a Matter of Reciprocity and Comity
By removing the FSIA as a potential barrier to litigation, this
Comment’s proposed exception recognizes the unique nature of the
values at stake in human rights litigation. As such, the proposed exception (1) tips the balance between foreign affairs interests and the
individual interests of human rights litigants in TVPA cases in favor of
the latter,290 and (2) guarantees that the basic values underlying the
majority of claims in human rights litigation are protected.291
1. The Proposed Exception Tips the Balance Sought in Litigation
Involving Foreign Sovereigns in Favor of the Interests of
Human Rights Litigants
Human rights cases are based on the most basic and essential of
human liberties—“freedom of thought, liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention.”292
Human rights litigation represents, therefore, “not merely . . . ideals,
or goals” about the way that the world should be, but rather “rights . . .
to be vindicated by an effective remedy.”293 When a defendant in a
287. Id.
288. See supra text accompanying note 285.
289. See supra text accompanying note 283.
290. See infra Part III.C.1.
291. See infra Part III.C.2.
292. Schwartz, supra note 229, at 275 (discussing the unique nature of human rights
claims).
293. Re, supra note 1, at 592.
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TVPA suit argues that he is entitled to FSIA immunity, the ability of a
human rights plaintiff to seek such a remedy is called into question.294
When a defendant in a suit outside of the human rights context argues that he is entitled to FSIA immunity, other interests are primarily
at stake—namely, those of international reciprocity and comity.295 To
be sure, plaintiffs in other kinds of suits have individual interests at
stake, but those claims are likely to be weighed against a heavy interest
in fostering the foreign affairs norms of reciprocity and comity.296 In
the context of human rights litigation, however, the balance between
comity and individual interests ought to shift in favor of the interests
of human rights litigants.297 Such a balance could be achieved by recognizing an exception to the immunity of individual government officials in cases in which claims are brought under the TVPA—an
interpretation of the FSIA that would prevent it from barring all TVPA
claims. Because the FSIA was designed, in part, to codify common-law
principles of comity and reciprocity,298 the proposed exception for
claims brought under the TVPA shifts the balance in favor of the in-

294. If FSIA immunity is granted, the plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 61. Dismissal of the claim denies the
plaintiff an opportunity for remedy.
295. See supra note 36 (defining comity). Reciprocity, as a concept in international law,
is the “mutual concession of advantages or privileges for purposes of commercial or diplomatic relations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004). The Schooner Exchange
noted that at the very heart of foreign sovereign immunity are notions of international
grace and comity, doctrines that dictate the way that foreign sovereigns interact with each
other. See supra Part II.A.1.
296. See supra text accompanying note 232 (outlining claims asserted by plaintiffs in the
majority’s cases); see also Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Note, “The Nile Reconstituted”: Executive Statements, International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political Question Doctrine, 89 B.U. L. REV.
295, 325–26 (2009) (noting that international comity is structured as a balancing test, in
which the interests of foreign affairs are weighed against individual remedy interests).
297. Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts:
The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 186 (1985) (“In the
human rights context . . . invoking a desire for comity as a justification for judicial abstention survives neither practical nor moral analysis.”). Such a practice seems to have taken
root. See Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General
Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 214
(2002) (noting that courts are reluctant to apply comity in cases in which gross violations
of human rights are alleged); see also Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009) (No. 081555) (arguing that “comity among nations does not require that former foreign officials
be shielded by sovereign immunity from suit for alleged torture and extrajudicial
executions”).
298. See supra Part II.B.1 (noting that the FSIA was designed to codify existing commonlaw principles); see also supra note 36 (discussing the extent to which comity was a key
principle of the common-law understanding of immunity).
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terests of human rights litigants.299 Shifting the balance in this way is
appropriate if not necessary because the present doctrine seems to
reflect “perverse priorities” about which plaintiffs are entitled to remedy300 and because although victims of human rights are accorded a
unique status in international law, present legal doctrines, by and
large, prevent their suits from going forward.
First, the present doctrine as to the immunity of individual government officials reflects unacceptable priorities.301 As the FSIA is
currently understood by the majority of courts, an individual is only
able to bring suit against an individual government official for alleged
acts of torture or extrajudicial killing if those acts are perpetrated in a
country covered by the terrorism exception.302 If the events took
place outside of a country designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism,”
under the majority understanding of the FSIA, the plaintiff is out of
luck. An exception exists, however, for many commercial grievances,
regardless of the location in which the alleged conduct occurred.303
Under the majority’s current approach to the FSIA, the statute seems
to reflect “perverse priorities” because it allows individuals with commercial grievances against an individual foreign government official
to litigate their claims, but denies that opportunity to individuals who
have been subjected to torture or extrajudicial killing.304 In debating
proposals to amend the FSIA to include a human rights exception,
the House Judiciary Committee illustrated its belief that the right of
an American citizen to be compensated by a foreign sovereign for torture is at least as important as the right to sue a foreign government
for breach of contract.305 At present, unfortunately, that is not the law
in the majority of circuits. Recognizing a doctrine that exempts individual government officials accused of human rights violations under
299. At present, the FSIA “serves as both a shield . . . and as a sword, destroying any
opportunity for human rights victims to obtain the recognition of the inherent dignity
owed to all members of the human family.” Fastiggi, supra note 270, at 399.
300. Jennifer A. Gergen, Note, Human Rights and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 36
VA. J. INT’L L. 765, 791 (1996).
301. Id.
302. See Elizabeth Defeis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Human Rights Violations, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 363, 371 (2002) (noting that under the FSIA terrorism
exception, the United States has made clear that it “do[es] not accept state-sponsored
terrorism,” and arguing that “we ought not accept other serious violations of human
rights”).
303. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (commercial activities exception); see also supra
note 269 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulties in fitting human rights allegations into the scheme outlined by the commercial activities exception to the FSIA).
304. Gergen, supra note 300, at 791.
305. H.R. REP. NO. 102-900, at 4 (1992).
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the TVPA from FSIA immunity would enable the Committee’s belief
to become a reality.
Assuredly, not everyone will agree that shifting the balance in
favor of human rights litigants is appropriate.306 Several additional
comments are therefore useful. First, the only parties likely to complain about such an exception would be the “offending governments
themselves.”307 Moreover, a country accused of perpetrating or condoning human rights abuses “could hardly claim the defense of comity,” given that the majority of the “responsible world community”
condemns such abuses.308 Second, foreign governments may base
suits against the United States on the FSIA and on the principle of
international reciprocity.309 This should pose no concern to the
United States so long as it adheres to both its own laws and international standards.310 Finally, rather than viewing such a shift as moving
away from international comity, it may be appropriate to view it as “an
act of international moral leadership on the part of the United
States.”311 Providing an exception to the immunity of individual government officials in cases in which human rights abuses are alleged
under the TVPA sends a signal to the world that the United States will
not tolerate international torture—and may encourage other nations
to similarly disavow the use of torture.312
306. See, e.g., Brief of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009) (No. 08-1555) (arguing that “sovereign immunity remains critically important to the amicable relations among nations and
such immunity must extend to” individuals); Ismael Diaz, Comment, A Critique of Proposals
to Amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to Allow Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns for Human
Rights Violations, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 137, 140 (2001) (arguing that a FSIA
human rights exception would be imprudent in light of key foreign policy considerations).
307. Ziman, supra note 250, at 205.
308. Id. (analogizing this situation to the equitable doctrine of “‘unclean hands’”).
309. See Jacobson, supra note 221, at 757 (briefly describing how the FSIA impacts international relations).
310. See generally Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 33, 35 (2006) (detailing anti-torture
arguments under domestic and international standards). In fact, if the United States were
engaging in acts that would make it eligible for suit under a statute similar to the TVPA in
another country, its objection to this exception would carry little weight, as it would seem
to be operating only as “an offending government,” complaining because the law inhibits
application of desired polices. See supra text accompanying note 307.
311. Alexander J. Mueller, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and the Need for a Human Rights Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 13 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 87, 119 (2000); see also
Gergen, supra note 300, at 790–91 (discussing the likelihood that the conduct of a foreign
country may be influenced by the possibility that it will be held accountable for it in U.S.
courts).
312. See Beth Ann Isenberg, Comment, Genocide, Rape, and Crimes Against Humanity: An
Affirmation of Individual Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia in the Karadžić Actions, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1997) (“The United States has the opportunity to make a positive,
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Furthermore, victims of human rights abuse are accorded a
unique status in international law.313 Given, however, the absence of
an explicit human rights exception in the FSIA and the difficulties of
fitting human rights claims into an existing exception,314 the majority’s current approach to the FSIA effectively “close[s] the court
doors” to human rights litigants whose claims do not fit into the FSIA
terrorism exception.315 This denial of access to justice is particularly
troubling in the case of human rights abuse for several reasons. First,
from a purely moral standpoint, human rights cases seem to “cry out
for legal remedies” more than any other because “[t]he injuries inflicted by torture [and] extrajudicial killing are the gravest imaginable.”316 Second, denial of access to the courts denies plaintiffs of their
only opportunity to seek compensation for the wrongs done to
them,317 creating an unfortunate exception to the principle that victims of wrongs are entitled to their day in court.318 The exception
definitive, and necessary statement in the realm of fundamental human rights law.”); cf.
Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 485,
490 (2001) (“I believe that a human rights oriented foreign policy would greatly benefit
the United States, as well as the rest of the world.”).
313. See Correale, supra note 218, at 197 (“Almost every nation is willing to agree, as an
abstract principle, that the rights of human beings are entitled to some level of respect and
protection.”); cf. Jamie O’Connell, Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights
Violators Console Their Victims?, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 295, 303–04 (2005) (discussing the
unique effect that human rights abuse has on its victims, in contrast to the after-effects
experienced by victims of ordinary violence).
314. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing difficulties in pursuing human rights claims
through existing FSIA exceptions).
315. Reimann, supra note 264, at 419.
316. Id. Take for example, the case of plaintiff Abiola in Enahoro v. Abubakar, representing the estate of her father, who died in prison as a result of the inhuman conditions in
which he was kept, his subjection to torture, and the repeated denial of medical treatment.
408 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2005). Another example is the case of anonymous plaintiff
Jane Doe in Yousuf v. Samantar, who, over a period of three and a half years, was held in
solitary confinement and repeatedly raped and beaten. 552 F.3d 71, 374 (4th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009). See generally Linda Piwowarczyk, Seeking Asylum: A Mental
Health Perspective, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 155, 157–60 (2005) (listing “common psychological
responses” to torture, and noting that torture may devastate a variety of “human
capacities”).
317. See Brief of the Foreign Minister for Republic of Somaliland, Abdillahi Mohamed
Duale, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49
(2009) (No. 08-1555) (highlighting that the “flagrant crimes of the Siad Barre regime”
have never “been addressed in a court of law,” and that because there is “no mechanism
for the victims of his human-rights abuses to obtain a civil remedy” in Somalia, if these
victims “do not receive a measure of justice in the United States courts, they will receive no
justice at all”).
318. Reimann, supra note 264, at 419. But see Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Jewish Congress in Support of Petitioner at 42, Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (No. 08-1555) (arguing
that there are “ample international remedies apart from civil suits” for human rights victims); Brief of Amici Curiae Former Attorneys General of the United States in Support of
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proposed by this Comment would re-open court doors to human
rights litigants by preventing the FSIA from operating as a barrier to
their TVPA suits.
2.

An Exception to the Immunity of Individual Government Officials
for Cases Brought Under the TVPA Would Ensure that the
Basic Values at Issue in Human Rights Litigation Are
Protected

The proposed exception to the FSIA immunity doctrine would
help to ensure that the values at stake in human rights litigation319 are
protected by (1) insisting that perpetrators of human rights violations
are held accountable for their actions, and (2) preventing human
rights violators from seeking safe haven in the United States. First,
civil litigation can be an important part of “the search for accountability for human rights violations.”320 Successful litigation resulting in an
enforceable monetary judgment serves compensatory and punitive
purposes and may deter future human rights abuses.321 Even if the
enforcement of a monetary judgment is not feasible, the litigation, by
“produc[ing] a full factual investigation,” may “lead[ ] to public recognition of [the] victim’s injuries and the defendant’s culpability.”322
Revealing the culpability of the defendant to the general public may
also have future legal repercussions, such as deportation or visa denial.323 Finally, civil litigation helps the human rights movements in
the countries where the abuse occurred by providing a case around
which human rights education and organization may focus.324
Second, by denying FSIA immunity to individual government officials in cases in which allegations of human rights abuse are brought
Petitioner at 17, Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (No. 08-1555) (arguing that “application of the FSIA
to foreign officials does not foreclose other accountability mechanisms” for victims); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 22 (listing other “legitimate mechanisms of human
rights accountability” that a state could employ in lieu of denying foreign sovereign immunity to individual government officials).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 292–93 (detailing the values at stake in such
litigation).
320. Beth Stephens, Accountability Without Hypocrisy: Consistent Standards, Honest History,
36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 919, 926 (2002). The TVPA only provides for a civil remedy, not a
criminal one.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 926–27.
323. Id. at 927; see also Simona Agnolucci, Deportation of Human Rights Abusers: Towards
Achieving Accountability, Not Fostering Impunity, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 347, 382
(2007) (noting that although deportation “does not by itself constitute adequate punishment,” it may “[u]nder certain circumstances . . . become a means, albeit an imperfect
means, of achieving accountability” for human rights abuses).
324. Stephens, supra note 320, at 927.
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under the TVPA, the proposed exception prevents such individuals
from using the United States as a safe haven. The Center for Justice
and Accountability estimates that, as of 2005, several hundred individuals accused of violating human rights live in this country, and several
dozen more visit each year.325 Denying FSIA immunity to individual
government officials accused of violating human rights will make
them eligible for suit under the TVPA. If these individuals are eligible
for suit and eventually tried, it seems likely that other similarly situated individuals will be deterred from coming to the United States.326
Preventing these foreign officials from finding safe haven in the
United States is a valuable goal that goes hand in hand with efforts to
bring them to justice in our court system.
This Comment does not suggest that the United States can remedy all of the world’s human rights problems.327 It does suggest, however, that the TVPA, as written, provides a workable standard under
which individual government officials may be tried by a neutral court
for allegations of human rights abuse. The exception to the FSIA doctrine that this Comment proposes would simply allow the TVPA to do
so.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resolution of the circuit split as to whether an individual government official constitutes a “foreign state” for purposes of FSIA immunity could be meaningfully achieved by accepting the majority
viewpoint in all cases except those which involve allegations of human
rights abuse brought under the TVPA. This Comment has shown that
recognizing a limited exception to the majority’s interpretation of the
“agency or instrumentality” language of Section 1603(b) for human
rights cases brought under the TVPA would create consistency between the present FSIA doctrine and the motivations behind congressional enactment of the TVPA,328 place interpretation of the FSIA in
325. Sandra Coliver et al., Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
169, 175 (2005). For example, the defendant in the case of Yousuf v. Samantar, who is
accused of perpetrating serious human rights violations in Somalia in the 1970s, was found
residing in Fairfax, Virginia. No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2007), rev’d, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009).
326. Coliver et al., supra note 325, at 176; see also Brief for the Respondents at 57, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 49 (2009) (No. 08-1555) (arguing that effective use of the
TVPA “would chill foreign officials not in the making of legitimate governmental decisions, but in making their vacation or residency plans”).
327. In fact, it would be “hopelessly idealistic to expect that we could and presumptuous
to assume that it is our place to do so.” Schwartz, supra note 229, at 337.
328. See supra Part III.A.
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line with congressional motivations for its creation in 1976,329 and acknowledge that a fundamental difference exists between the values at
stake in human rights litigation brought under the TVPA and the values at stake in other kinds of litigation.330 If Judge Re is correct, and
the courts “cannot isolate themselves from the great moral issues of
the day,”331 resolving the tension between the TVPA and the FSIA exposed by the existing circuit split might be a good place to start. This
Comment’s proposed exception would resolve that tension, while providing a remedy for victims of human rights violations in American
courts. Ensuring that justice is afforded to such victims is undoubtedly one of the “great moral issues of the day,”332 and one from which
the courts should not shy away. The present inability of human rights
litigants to seek relief in United States courts represents not just a
disservice to those litigants, but the endurance of a doctrine that facilitates the moral isolationist policy that Judge Re warned against, a policy that runs counter to the admirable traditions of our democratic
society.333

329. See supra Part III.B.
330. See supra Part III.C.
331. Re, supra note 1, at 591.
332. Id.; see also Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1749 (2005) (“The most important issue about torture remains
the moral issue of the deliberate infliction of pain, the suffering that results, the insult to
dignity, and the demoralization and depravity that is . . . associated with [the]
enterprise . . . .”).
333. Stephens, supra note 312, at 493.
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